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The Morning Joe and NOH referenced a recent op-ed written by some of the NOH staff in The Register Citizen that advances a number of questionable arguments in favor of ratifying the CTBT. Diving right in, it argues:

Nuclear weapons tests are a toxic relic of a past characterized by arms races and fallout shelters. Except for outlaw nations like North Korea, the world today has quit the business of testing nuclear weapons.

The French test in 1995 and the Indian and Pakistani tests in 1998 (not to mention recent murmurings within India they should test again) at least call into question the idea that only “outlaw nations like North Korea” have refused to quit the "toxic relic of the past" business of testing. It is unlikely the U.S. (and France…and probably India and Pakistan) test anytime soon but the core of the debate is whether the fact we are unlikely to test means we have no reason not to sign the treaty or whether the U.S. should refuse to lock itself into permanently forswearing nuclear tests. The latter argument, whether or not correct, could certainly include unpredictable scenarios where another country, including one that may not be an “outlaw nation,” tests or undertakes other destabilizing measures that could put significant pressure on the U.S. to test. Next it argues: 

FISSILE MATERIAL
Russia Seeks Removal of U.S. Observers Under New Nuclear Accord
Bloomberg by Lyubov Pronina

Tauscher promotes new missile defense plan before trip to Europe
Foreign Policy (The Cable) by Josh Rogin

Diplomats: Iran nuke plant 7 yrs old
AP by George Jahn

Pakistanis Worry About US Nuclear Intentions
NYT by AP

Well, not exactly, but the Obama administration’s diplomatic outreach to Iran is apparently causing some conflict within the Iranian government. Gerald Seib, Washington bureau chief for the Wall Street Journal, recently reported that while the P5 + 1 (or the EU3 + 3, take your pick) debate the merits of another round of harsh economic sanctions, “more meaningful stress fractures are showing up within Iran itself.” Since Iranian negotiators in Geneva agreed, in principle, to the exportation of low-enriched uranium for conversion into fuel for the Tehran medical research reactor, there has been a substantial split in rhetoric among Iranian officials.

With START expiration now 25 days out, it’s high tide as the sides rush to try to finalize an agreement. According to AFP (and GSN) there still some kinks to work out on mobile Topols and delivery vehicle numbers:

The Kommersant daily, citing an expert familiar with the START talks, said Washington was seeking to keep a provision from the original treaty for monitoring Russia's arsenal of mobile ground-based missiles. "They are offering to keep and even strengthen control over our mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) such as the Topol," the expert was quoted as saying by Kommersant. Russia is against the proposal since the United States currently does not have its own mobile ground-based ICBMs and it is therefore of "unilateral character," he said. The maximum number of "carriers" capable of delivering nuclear warheads remains another sticking point, the newspaper reported. "In their package, the Americans stipulated a new ceiling for warhead carriers that we don't quite agree with," the expert told Kommersant, referring to proposals presented to Moscow last month by US National Security Adviser James Jones.

The GSN article also cited Aleksey Fenenko as saying Obama’s moves on missile defense don’t completely placate Russian concerns although this does not seem to be at the heart of the current disagreements. Washington, meanwhile, is less than stoked about Russia’s response to the offer Jim Jones brought over last week. RIA Novosti (via Lexis Nexis) explains:

Ellen Tauscher, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, on Tuesday expressed discontent with Russia's response to an arms control offer recently put forward by the Obama administration. It was the first American official admittance of problems at the talks . . .The snag in the agreement is that the United States wants to retain close control over Russia's Topol mobile ICBMs.

FISSILE MATERIAL
Exclusive: Iranian enrichment has not grown: diplomats
Reuters by Mark Heinrich

Ahmadinejad suggests Iran role in atom fuel bank
Reuters

US-Russia nuclear talks hit snag: report
AFP

The Senate and the START treaty
Washington Times by Robert S. Norris

Secretary Clinton helped roll out the administration's modernization Stockpile Management Program (SMP) in her remarks at USIP by stating:

So in addition to supporting a robust nuclear complex budget in 2011, we will also support a new Stockpile Management Program that would focus on sustaining capabilities. This is what the military leaders, charged with responsibility for our strategic deterrent, need in order to defend our country. General Chilton, Commander of U.S. STRATCOM, has said repeatedly that he doesn’t need new nuclear weapons capabilities – but he must be confident in the capabilities that we have.

Marc Ambinder initially read the last sentence as a swipe at Chilton but a DoD official called and clarified:

What Chilton said accurately reflects where Secretary Gates is and the rest of the military is, which is that the arsenal we do have needs to be tended to, so that we can assure our allies and our adversaries that our stockpile has the capabilities that we say it has

While officials from DoD, State, and the administration were quick to argue "the interagency process to produce a new nuclear posture review is proceeding apace without exposing grand fissures," Ambinder points out "That doesn't mean there aren't any fissures."  For the prime example, see Elaine Grossman's article in August (and our post about it) which probably foreshadows disagreementsthat will occur between top officials about what the SMP should include. 

Last week, we hosted our fifth live debate.  In one of the best debates of the series, John Steinbruner, Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, and Walt Slocombe, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, debated about de-alerting the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals.  The audio and video is available here.

The specific topic wording was:

Resolved: that the United States should pursue a negotiated agreement with Russia to de-alert each country's nuclear arsenal by implementing reversible physical changes to substantially increase the time required to launch

Each side, Steinbruner on the affirmative and Slocombe on the negative, gave an opening statement.  The statements were followed by a series of question periods (asking each other, moderator, then audience) and brief closing remarks.

When Obama announched a change in U.S. strategy for missile defense in Europe, many accused him of abandoning Poland and the Czech Republic, who had agreed to host third-site interceptors and an advanced radar respectively.  At the time, I thought that the administration might take other steps to assure our allies including involving them in alternative missile defense deployments.

This is the strategy the administration has pursued.  Poland has agreed to host SM3 batteries (which is what they wanted in the first place), and the Czech Republic accepted a role in the modified plan.  The New York Times reported that the Czechs were willing to participate after a visit by Vice President Biden a few weeks ago, but didn't have any details on their specific role.