Blog

Picking up on last week’s discussion, one of the elephants in the NFU room is the domestic political feasibility of currently making such a pledge.  If the NPR were to come out in favor of such an approach that could provide some political traction for the administration but that seems unlikely.  In the exchange in Survival about NFU this month, Mort Halperin’s article was particularly interesting. While Scott Sagan takes Keith Payne and Bruno Tertrais head on about whether adopting NFU is a good idea, Halperin has “come to the conclusion that this is a good idea whose time has not yet come.”  He argues:

 There are other proposals to pursue this objective which would be as effective as a declaratory no-first-use policy and which might produce less controversy.  In his Prague speech, in addition to announcing support for the long-term objective of a world free of nuclear weapons, Obama committed himself in the short run to four other measures which have long been debated and which advance the same objectives as the no-first-use proposal. These are: reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy, negotiating a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia, immediately and aggressively pursuing US ratification of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and starting negotiations on a verifiable end to the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. This ambitious agenda will require all the attention and political capital the president can reasonably devote to this issue. Under the circumstances, no first use can and should be put off for another day. Seeking three treaties on nuclear arms control in his first term will not be easy.

FISSILE MATERIAL
U.S. Weighs Pyongyang Envoy
WSJ by Evan Ramstad

Iran Is Said to Ignore Effort to Salvage a Nuclear Deal
NYT by David E. Sanger

Medvedev Says Russia May Back Sanctions on Iran if Deal Falls Apart
NYT by Ellen Barry

Defending the Arsenal
New Yorker by Seymour M. Hersh

FISSILE MATERIAL
Iran tested advanced nuclear warhead design – secret report
Guardian by Julian Borger

Iran holding up nuclear deal with demand for reactor fuel, diplomat says
WP by Glenn Kessler

Bunkers or Breakthrough?
NYT by Roger Cohen

Passing the buck on North Korea 
Asia Times by Donald Kirk

Here's the final resolution and agenda for tonight's de-alerting debate between John Steinbruner and Walt Slocombe.  You can still RSVP by contacting Chris Jones at: cjones@csis.org.  We look forward to seeing you tonight.

PONI Live Debate: De-Alerting
November 5, 2009, 6:00-8:00 P.M.
B1 Conference Center, CSIS

Resolved: that the United States should pursue a negotiated agreement with Russia to de-alert each country's nuclear arsenal by implementing reversible physical changes to substantially increase the time required to launch

6:00-6:20     OPENING RECEPTION AND WELCOME

6:20-7:30     THE DE-ALERTING DEBATE
Affirmative: John D. Steinbruner, Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland
Negative: Walter B. Slocombe, Former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
Moderator: John K. Warden, Project on Nuclear Issues, CSIS

6:20-6:35   Opening Statements
6:35-6:50   Cross-Examination and Moderator Questions
6:50-7:20   Audience Question and Answer
7:20-7:30   Closing Statements

7:30-8:00     CLOSING RECEPTION
 

FISSILE MATERIAL
Nuke negotiator heads to U.S. to discuss N.K.
Korea Herald by Kim Ji-hyun

Iran wants to be seen as regional power: ElBaradei
Reuters by Louis Charbonneau

Iran On the Edge
Foreign Policy by Hossein Askari

Mohamed ElBaradei looks to US to fix nuclear system 'in tatters'
CSM by Howard LaFranchi

Following up on Joshua Pollack’s post on ACW about the problems with negotiating through public statements, it looks like German Chancellor Angela Merkel took some time during her address to Congress yesterday, which was mostly about climate change, to add her two cents worth of provocation.

The $52 billion question looming large for the NPR and how to prepare the U.S. strategy for the 2010 RevCon: what are these things for? While the SPRC noted “the principal function of nuclear weapons has not changed in decades: deterrence” it was quickly explained that “the Commission takes a very broad view of the concept of deterrence, encompassing many elements.” Likewise, Laura Holgate noted the CFR Task Force “fails in what I believed was to have been its primary goal: to provide a clear and actionable statement of the purposes served by nuclear weapons.” In an effort to satisfy the President’s Prague object to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, many argue that the role should essentially be restricted to deterring the attack of nuclear weapons as seen in Daryl Kimball’s “Core Deterrence” concept, Joe Cirincione’s remarks in his interview with Daily Kos, and Scott Sagan’s article in Survival continuing his case for a No First Use.

Of all the items on the Obama administration’s nuclear weapons policy agenda, negotiating and ratifying a new START is the top priority.  START was also the topic of a panel discussion last week, hosted by the U.S. Institute for Peace.  Panelists included Ambassador Linton Brooks, Joe Cirincione, and Tom Scheber.  The discussion focused on both the details of START negotiations and the role that a new START plays in the administration’s disarmament and nonproliferation agenda.

It’s not surprising that a new START is the administration’s number one priority.  First, the current START expires on December 5th.  Without a new agreement, Russia will be able add warheads to its strategic launchers.  Furthermore, according to a report last week, the administration wants an agreement completed before Obama accepts his Nobel Peace Price on December 10th.

More importantly, completing a new START is seen as an important part of the administration’s disarmament and nonproliferation agenda.  According to Cirincione, the administration sees START as an important catalyst for the rest of its disarmament agenda.  Negotiated cuts in the U.S. and Russia arsenals could generate momentum for further reductions in the role of nuclear weapons (including ratification of the CTBT) before the May 2010 NPT Review Conference.

So the important question is:  Will the administration get its wish?  Really, it’s a two part question.  First, will the U.S. and Russia be able to complete negotiations promptly so an agreement can be signed?