• Jan 23, 2009

    RAND and the Air Force are teaming up to host a seminar on deterrence at Barksdale Air Force Base today.  According to the Shreveport Times, the seminar will largely be classified.  Discussing the agenda for the meeting Lt. Gen. Robert J. Elder Jr. said,

    This event focuses on global deterrence from a historical perspective, but with a view towards improving our capabilities today and posturing for the future.

    In the wake of Schlesinger 1 and Schlesinger 2 it will important to see how the Air Force and the rest of DoD respond to both the lack of attention to the nuclear issue and also the deterrence calculations put forth in Schelsinger 2.  Stay tuned for updates of any press coverage related to the unclassified parts of the event. UPDATE: The Shreveport Times published an article on Saturday briefly discussing the unclassified opening remarks by Lt. Gen. Robert J. Elder Jr.

  • Jan 22, 2009

    According to Global Security Newswire, North Koreans told Selig Harrison that they had weaponized approximately 30 kilograms of plutonium.  As part of the discussions the officials relayed the message that,

    North Korea is now a nuclear weapons state and will not commit itself now on when it will give it up as a result of denuclearization negotiations

    At the same time, the Associated Press recently reported that South Korea's number 2 negotiator confirmed that North Korea is in fact moving towards its goal of disarmament and Reuters published an article discussing a pro-Pyongyang paper's article about the North's willingness to work with the Administration. It will be interesting to see to how these seemingly different paths will be reconciled in negotiations with the incoming Obama Administration.  North Korean hardline attempts may make concessions at the bargaining table become even more difficult.  With Kim Jong Il's health constantly in question, it will be important to see who becomes in charge of calling the shots in North Korea.

  • Jan 21, 2009

    PONI member Raja Karthikeya wrote the following original piece for the PDTI blog on the implications of U.S. extension of BMD to India:

     

    BMD, India and the Atom

    Raja Karthikeya Gundu (Junior Fellow - Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University)

    The bilateral discussions to extend the US missile defense shield to India have restarted the debate about India’s nuclear posture and its implications for US security architecture. In recent years, India has made considerable strides towards a triad of nuclear delivery systems. Two of the three legs of the triad are fairly functional since the acquisition of Su-30s from Russia and the successful deployment of the indigenously developed Prithvi and Agni missiles. At the same time, since India has an avowed “no first use policy”, these fighter-bombers, and missiles are part of the India’s counterstrike capabilities which need to be safeguarded, ostensibly with a ballistic missile shield.  India has made an effort to develop an indigenous system - the “Pradyumna”. But, India has simultaneously been interested in acquiring the Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system from the US, especially for exo-atmospheric interception of Chinese IRBMs.

  • Jan 16, 2009

    In an intriguing letter, three former British military officials raised doubts about the need for the use of Britain's trident system.  The AP reported that Field Marshal Dwin Bramal and retired Army generals David Ramsbotham and Hugh Beach downplayed the ability of nuclear weapons to deal with the prominent threats in today's security environment.  Of particularly interest to the United States were a couple of arguments made about the role of the United States in Britain's nuclear affairs:

    • The British rely on U.S. developed missiles, as evidenced by the December sale of 2/3 of AWE Management, Inc. to Lockheed and Jacobs Engineering, Inc.  places a large portion of the responsibility for producing Trident
    • The role of U.S. support in deterrence calculations.  The letter was quoted as saying, "It is unthinkable that, because of the catastrophic consequences for guilty and innocent alike, these weapons would ever be launched, or seriously threatened, without the backing and support of the United States."

    Should Britain scrap its Trident system? What role should the United States play in supporting British nuclear policy?

  • Jan 16, 2009

    PONI member Michael Tkacik wrote the following original piece for the PDTI blog:

    Much has been written about the security environment in Pakistan and its effect on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. These factors certainly complicate U.S. national security. But even without this dangerous environment (one that includes a major foe to the south, an Islamist insurgency, a terrible economy, proliferation, etc.), Pakistan’s program presents problems. This entry briefly outlines the problems inherent in the structure of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program can be characterized as capable and growing, especially in terms of the warheads and delivery systems. At the same time, Pakistan’s program evidences a number of weaknesses that heighten the risk of undesired use of nuclear weapons during a crisis. The program has an underdeveloped command and control (C&C) system and a doctrine that encourages rather than discourages use.

  • Jan 16, 2009

    Gary Hart, former senator from Colorado,  published a piece about the current nuclear tipping point that exists in regards to the nuclear arsenal.  He cites the four statesmen op-ed and the creation of Global Zero as two of the largest reason behind bringing about this tipping point. When evaluating the reasons behind the shift, he postulates ideas that range from military to political to a care for future generations.  While the move toward global reductions has received increased press attention, there seems to be a great deal debate about the timeframe for these activities.  Hart argues,

    Now faced with frightening economic consequences of unregulated market collapse and the prospects of a very long international economic recovery, a new Obama administration in Washington could well be looking at initiatives that bring increased security at little or no cost, or indeed that produce cost savings. Nuclear zero, elimination of nuclear arsenals, must be at the top of this list. It may be argued that the president must fix the economy first before anything else gains attention. This false argument assumes intelligent people can do only one thing, even one complex thing, at a time or that some talented economic people cannot carry out their project while other talented diplomatic people carry out quite another

    How quickly can the United States move in the direction towards zero? How feasible is the realization of cost savings related to reducing the nuclear arsenal? How large of a role will nuclear reductions actually play on the very full plate of the incoming Administration?

  • Jan 15, 2009

    PONI member David Gill contributed the following original piece to the PDTI blog: