NATO: Allies in Action?

 DefenseNews, by Julianne Smith

Copyright 2004 Defense News and Army Times Publishing Co. All Rights Reserved Defense News July 19, 2004 Monday SECTION: COMMENTARY; Pg. 60 LENGTH: 804 words HEADLINE: NATO: Allies in Action?; Results Fall Far Short of Vision, Promises BODY: In his testimony before the U.S. House International Relations Committee in mid-June, Robert Bradtke of the U.S. State Department described NATO as an "alliance in action." Two weeks later, NATO's Istanbul Summit appeared to validate that title. During their two-day meeting, NATO members agreed to train Iraqi security forces, send 3,500 more troops to Afghanistan, strengthen the alliance's counterterrorism efforts, improve NATO's relationship with its Mediterranean partners, and hand over command of the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia to the European Union. But NATO enthusiasts should be cautioned against becoming overly optimistic. This is still mostly talk, which may prove difficult to translate into action. Resource constraints and deep strategic divisions continue to plague NATO's credibility, efficacy and future. The alliance must grapple with the issues that derail its decision-making and hamper execution. Earlier this year, U.S. President George W. Bush's administration had hoped to secure the alliance's commitment to send more troops to Iraq. Instead, NATO officials at Istanbul agreed to train Iraqi security forces. But they failed to agree where, how and when to train them, thanks largely to the French government, which still harbors resentment for the rush to war in Iraq and hesitates to help Bush refute claims that he has damaged transAtlantic ties. Despite the agreements from all other NATO members, including Germany, that they could and would support a training mission inside Iraq, French President Jacques Chirac argued that training conducted on Iraqi soil under a NATO flag would produce "negative consequences." As a result, NATO members will spend the summer arguing over the details of a training program while the security situation on the ground deteriorates. Discussion of NATO's role in Afghanistan proved less contentious, but yielded little more than a reiteration of past promises. The alliance agreed to increase the number of troops from 6,500 to 10,000, allowing NATO to expand the International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) outside of Kabul. One might recall, however, that NATO made that same commitment in 2003 but failed to muster the political will to follow through. Though the alliance has more than 2,000 helicopters and 1.4 million troops in Europe, it took more than seven months to deploy three choppers to the Afghan theater. Skepticism about NATO's resolve abounds, especially after members flatly rejected the secretary general's recent proposal to send the new NATO Response Force into Afghanistan this fall. NATO's ability to meet the challenges posed by Iraq and Afghanistan ultimately rests on whether it can find a way to match its means to its missions. Unfortunately, poor contingency funding, inadequate long-term planning and declining defense budgets received very little attention at the summit. No new capability initiatives were launched, although NATO members did approve "usability" targets, committing themselves to being able to deploy and sustain larger proportions of their forces on alliance operations. Longstanding Problem Of course, NATO has already spent years trying to address this resource gap. The Defense Capabilities Initiative, launched in 1999 amid the pomp and circumstance of the 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington, committed all NATO members to strengthen and improve their militaries. Three years later, when that commitment failed to produce concrete action, the alliance launched another initiative in Prague that was intended to be more realistic. Despite good intentions, that effort also has failed to bridge the gap between NATO goals and capabilities. Until NATO members answer the resource question (either through greater defense specialization or pooling of resources), missions like ISAF will risk pushing the alliance into strategic overload. Tackling today's security threats requires that NATO simultaneously "do" and "transform." But trying to do too much could make successful transformation impossible. NATO's future success also hangs on its ability to bridge the strategic divide between members. Summit attendees chose not to revisit their Strategic Concept, which was last updated in 1999. Given the current political environment and persistent trans-Atlantic tensions, NATO leaders rightly reserved that for future summits. As difficult as it will be, NATO members should try to tackle this challenge within the next year or two. The time has come for the alliance to revisit its decision-making process, review future enlargement plans, and outline its strategic vision and its role in today's global security environment.

Failure to address these issues will mean more muddling, which, as witnessed in Istanbul, threatens to turn NATO into an alliance of inaction.