U.S. and EU Threat Perceptions: Much Ado About Nothing?

In Crossing the Atlantic: A Report from the Aspen Atlantic Group, ed. Madeleine K. Albright and Kurt M. Campbell, 50-56 (Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute, 2004)

Report from the Aspen Atlantic Group 2003 Workshops

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MADELEINE K. KU RT M . CAMPBELL

Editors ALBRIGHT

CROSSING THE ATLANTIC
A REPORT FROM THE ASPEN ATLANTIC GROUP 2003 WORKSHOPS

EDITORS MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT K U R T M . CAMPBELL

To obtain additional copies of this report, please contact: The Aspen Institute Fulfillment Office P.O. Box 222 109 Houghton Lab Lane Queenstown, Maryland 21658 Phone: (410) 820-5338 Fax: (410) 827-9174 Email: publications@aspeninstitute.org For all other inquiries, please contact: The Aspen Institute Aspen Strategy Group One Dupont Circle, N.W. Suite 700 Washington, DC 20036 Phone: (202) 736-5800 Fax: (202) 467-0790 Copyright 2004 The Aspen Institute Published in the United States of America 2004 By the Aspen Institute All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 0-89843-395-9 Inv No.: 04-050 Cover Image: A boat's wake stretches across the Atlantic. Photograph by Isabel Cutler (www.didicutler.com).

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CONTENTS
FOREWORD
Madeleine K. Albright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 DISCUSSANTS AND GUEST EXPERTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 WORKSHOP I
James B. Steinberg An Elective Transatlantic Partnership for the 21st Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

WORKSHOP II
Jacques Beltran Diverging Threat Perceptions? The Need to Reconcile Efficiency and Multilateralism . . . . . 35 Julianne Smith U.S. and EU Threat Perceptions: Much Ado About Nothing? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Steven Everts Can the U.S. and Europe Work out a Common Agenda on Tough Issues such as Terrorism and The Greater Middle East? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 General Klaus D. Naumann (Ret.) Are the Lessons NATO Learned in the Balkans Applicable to Post-Conflict Iraq?. . . . . . . . . . 65

ASPEN ATLANTIC GROUP IRAQ STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

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FOREWORD
he end of the Cold War, the spread of globalization, European integration, the rise of new security threats, protectionist impulses, and the clashing styles of European and American leaders each have caused rising stress in relations across the Atlantic. These tensions were exacerbated by the 2003 Iraq war, launched after a debate that divided Europe and provoked bitterness between Washington and such key allied capitals as Paris and Berlin. Some observers confidently pronounced the transatlantic partnership dead due to irreconcilable differences of power, culture and worldview.

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This crisis has been bemoaned and celebrated, denied and confirmed, dissected and discussed in countless journals, articles, speeches and books. Very little, however, has been firmly agreed upon. The sense of common ground that was once ingrained among transatlantic partners has been replaced by a gnawing unease. The settled nerves that have heretofore helped Atlantic leaders absorb the bumps and bruises inherent in any relationship have been put on edge. Looking ahead, we can see both new possibilities for robust cooperation and future risks of renewed falling out. We have entered an age of uncertainty. The Aspen Atlantic Group consists of about a dozen former foreign ministers representing the United States, Canada and virtually every part of Europe. Operating under the auspices of the Aspen Institute's Aspen Strategy Group, we convene two to three times annually to address the changing and currently troubled face of the transatlantic relationship. Other leaders from both sides of the Atlantic, including prominent Republican and Democratic members of the U.S. Congress, have also attended. To provide a focus for our meetings, we ask distinguished commentators to prepare and present papers for discussion. This volume contains a set of such papers, prepared for our meetings during the summer of 2003 in Wye River, Maryland and Aspen, Colorado. As you will see, these essays are varied in source, content and outlook. Their freshness and diversity reflect the authors, some experienced policymakers and others chosen not only for their knowledge, but also for their presence within a new and rising generation of experts. Taken together, their contributions provide an abundance of provocative raw material, supplemented by facts and sound arguments, shedding light on such central questions as: Is there a place and purpose for U.S.-European cooperation in confronting 21st century dangers? Are the transatlantic organizations that were forged during the Cold War agile and adaptable enough to cope with these dangers? Do Europeans and Americans view the threats posed by international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction differently and, if so, why? What factors contribute to differences between European and American policies toward the Middle East Peace Process and the Arab and Islamic worlds more generally? To what extent are there gaps in perception about the value of multilateral institutions, global treaties and the content and importance of international law? As time passes, what effect on Euro-Atlantic relations will flow from the rise of a new generation of leaders with no memory of Cold War cooperation? CROSSING
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Aspen Atlantic Group Are current political tensions between Europe and America attributable to the particular philosophies of leaders now in office or are they a product of deeper differences inherent in the values of those living on either side of the Atlantic? From the perspective of transatlantic relations, what are the most significant opportunities and dangers that lie ahead? Obviously, the Aspen Atlantic Group is not a policymaking body. The ex-foreign ministers comprising it do not make binding decisions, nor do we have our own office, staff or letterhead. We do not speak for anyone except ourselves. We do, however, have a wealth of experience working together on behalf of the interests of our nations and in support of shared goals and common values. Together, while in office, we tackled issues ranging from the enlargement of NATO to the war in Kosovo, and from efforts to curb weapons proliferation to negotiations establishing the International Criminal Court. We served during a period of accelerating change, necessitating intense diplomatic activity characterized by hundreds of face-to-face meetings and nearly constant communication. We understood clearly that transatlantic cooperation was not a permanent given, but rather something that must be achieved and then reinforced time and time again. I cannot speak for my colleagues, but our mutual efforts enabled me to leave office with a strong sense of optimism about the flexibility and durability of the Euro-Atlantic partnership. I sometimes disagreed with my European counterparts, but I also found that, through hard work, we were able to hammer out at least a rough consensus on every truly critical issue. More recently, my optimism has been re-kindled by the deliberations of the former foreign ministers. At the Aspen Atlantic Group's meeting in August, for example, after much discussion we were able to agree on a common position toward the most controversial of all current issues the future of Iraq. That position was not some least common denominator compromise. Rather, it was a call for the immediate and massive commitment of resources by the United States, Europe and Canada to support Iraq's entry into the international community as an open and tolerant society. We argued that true resolve by the entire transatlantic community to work together would be decisive in helping secure and sustain the peace and prosperity in a post-conflict Iraq governed by its own institutions. Anyone seeking reassurance about the durability of U.S.-Canadian-European ties should bear in mind the many barriers surmounted in the past. This is no ordinary partnership. This is the team that beat Hitler, outlasted Communism, curbed ethnic cleansing and brought fully within reach the dream of a Europe without walls, wholly at peace and fully free. The fact that NATO is able now to devote its energy to debating "out of area" missions is an enormous accomplishment in itself, for it may be the first time in history an alliance forged to defend against one adversary has overcome and renewed its alliance vows with other dangers in mind. There was nothing inevitable about this. Many predicted that the end of the Soviet empire would lead in short order to renewed divisions both in the newly-liberated parts of Europe and within the West. It was not hard for a student of history to imagine a Europe re-divided into spheres of influence, with old rivalries re-kindled, and armed borders separating, for example, Poland and Ukraine or Romania and Hungary. Instead there is not a truly destabilizing flashpoint left in Europe. Much credit goes to the shared vision of Western leaders during the 1990s, from Bill Clinton and Helmut Kohl, to Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair. Inspirational voices in Central Europe, most particularly that of Czech President Vaclav Havel, also played a pivotal role. Building on the tradition of the first generation of postwar leaders such as Truman and Churchill, Adenauer and De Gaulle,

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Foreword they devised a set of incentives for democratization, economic reform and respect for minority rights that moved Europe forward without leaving any country behind. They created security arrangements that resulted in one-time adversaries serving side by side on behalf of stability and freedom in the Balkans, and adapted the institutions of the previous era and gave them new life as the 21st century began. It is, I believe, preposterous to suppose that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 rendered these accomplishments irrelevant. On the contrary, they provide the framework within which a new dimension in Euro-Atlantic cooperation forged by the current group of European and American leaders can find its place. As the essays in this book suggest, the differences between Europe and America are substantial, but there is also substantial agreement on the truly overriding issues of opposing terrorism and weapons proliferation and support for democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Whether the issue is a threatening al-Qaeda, a volatile Middle East, Iran's nuclear program, or the widening gap between haves and have-nots around the world, the opportunities for cooperation are as numerous as the need is great. In Aesop's fable, a lion hunts a group of bulls without success, because he always finds them gathered together in a circle. No matter which way the lion approaches, he is met by horns. Then one day, the bulls quarrel and depart angrily to separate pastures. One by one, they are devoured. Certainly, as we look around the world today, we see no shortage of prowling lions. The question we face is whether we will choose to meet them with joined horns, or in separate pastures. This book is designed to help us understand the many elements of that fateful choice. For the opportunity to offer these essays and ideas, I am deeply grateful to the Ford Foundation, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, DaimlerChrysler and the Hewlett Foundation for their generous support. I thank the Aspen Strategy Group and its tireless and brilliant director, Kurt Campbell, and the incomparable Walter Isaacson and the Aspen Institute, as a whole. I also salute my fellow alumni foreign ministers for their participation in this important enterprise, and offer my admiration and thanks to the distinguished expert authors of the presentations that follow.

Madeleine K. Albright March 2004

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
In two workshops, June 6-8 and July 31-August 2, 2003, the Aspen Atlantic Group and its guests examined avenues for renewed transatlantic cooperation in light of contemporary and cumulative challenges to the relationship. Having conducted a frank and in-depth diagnosis of core differences and commonalities in the first workshop, the second workshop extended its scope to include sessions on specific areas of collaboration such as homeland security and humanitarian intervention. The workshops' participants discussed their recommendations for steps necessary to reenergize and, in some cases, reengineer the transatlantic relationship. In an atmosphere of nonpartisan dialogue, they drew on their extensive experience in government to examine policy tools, institutional architecture, common paths, and areas of enduring difference. The conversation benefited from a provoking and insightful set of papers and presentations, many of which are published in the subsequent sections of this report. The session's funding came from nonprofit foundations including the Ford Foundation, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, the Hewlett Foundation, as well as from DaimlerChrysler, none of which exerted influence over the workshop deliberations. An executive summary of the workshops' discussions follows. This summary reflects the editors' subjective impressions of some key points to emerge from that discussion. One or another participant may not agree with each of these points, or the form in which they are expressed here. In particular, these points do not necessarily reflect the views of any of the government officials who participated in the sessions.

WORKSHOP I: WYE RIVER, MARYLAND, JUNE 6 THROUGH JUNE 8, 2003
A sharp escalation of divisive words and policies had markedly widened the transatlantic gap in the months leading to the Aspen Atlantic Group meeting in June. The leadership on both sides of the Atlantic conveyed frustration, disdain and, often, an increased desire to "go it alone." Reflected in public opinion data, Europeans' negative attitudes about the United States recently had intensified as well. Important surveys by the Pew Global Attitudes Project have found that U.S. favorability ratings plummeted in the six months between mid-2002 and early 2003 in countries both committed and opposed to the "coalition of the willing." In fact, in Great Britain, the public's favorable views of the U.S. dropped from 75 percent to 48 percent.1 In this environment of discord, Madeleine Albright and the Aspen Strategy Group brought 10 former foreign ministers and 17 experts and policy makers together for a frank discussion on the state of the transatlantic relationship and the tools and actions necessary to begin to repair it. The observations made in their gathering at The Aspen Institute's Wye River Campus follow below.

DIVERGENT PRIORITIES, PERCEPTIONS AND PATHS
Although transatlantic friction is not new Europe and America have faced thorny disagreements over the last 50 years on a wide variety of trade, security, and economic issues participants CROSSING
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Aspen Atlantic Group in the meeting emphatically voiced the sentiment that the transatlantic partners were in the midst of the most serious rift in the history of Euro-American relations. Some of the problems that have emerged are due to systemic and structural changes which have taken place in the international system in the last 13 years, including the end of the Soviet threat, globalization, democratization of technology, emergence of non-state actors, and the process of European integration. There is no question that September 11 has also affected U.S. leadership procedurally, psychologically, and substantively. New generations of leaders have become focused on internal developments and on security threats outside the traditional transatlantic area. Personal frictions unfortunately make it more difficult to find common ground, as the personal ties that helped leaders forge agreement during previous disputes seem lacking. Some believe that the transatlantic era has ended, and that the United States as the dominant global power can work with changing coalitions. Others believe that any global power still needs partners, and the task ahead is to ensure that the partnership changes with demands of the times. The participants recognized the tendency on both sides of the Atlantic to blame the other and agreed that both carry responsibility for the deterioration in the relationship. Europeans and Americans now find themselves with diverging and sometimes conflicting views on the institutions and concepts that make up that very system.

POLICY MAKERS VS. THE PUBLIC
Despite the differences over tools and strategies, many Atlanticists remain convinced that transatlantic common values freedom, rule of law, respect of human rights, democracy bind them together more than any two other areas of the world. Public attitudes on divisive issues such as the death penalty may be converging. Still, the recent study by the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that American views concerning immigration, homosexuality, religion, and social welfare do differ significantly from those of U.S. friends and allies in Europe and Canada. In the current environment, differences in political culture also matter; even conservative parties in Europe tend to view government as having a stronger role in protecting individual and social welfare than American conservatives accept. All these differences sometimes lead to conflicting worldviews. Despite some specific differences on agricultural policy or genetically modified organisms (GMOs), Europe and America's economic ties are the most binding in the transatlantic relationship. The U.S.-EU relationship remains the most important two-way economic relationship in the world with substantial financial, investment, and telecommunications linkages across the Atlantic.

AREAS OF COMMON GROUND AND ENDURING ISSUES OF CONTENTION
Europe and North America share a number of common interests including peace and stability in the Middle East, slowing the spread of AIDS in Africa, halting global warming, facilitating democratization, fighting terrorism, promoting the development of civil society in the Balkans, etc. With so many global challenges on the horizon, nothing short of a complete revitalization of the transatlantic relationship is needed. The meeting participants concluded after their first meeting at the Wye River campus in Maryland that the logical next phase of analysis would be to define a new

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Executive Summary basis for the relationship and identify the tools to engender cooperation on shared goals. Assuming that the two sides of the Atlantic agree on the need to cooperate on WMD, terrorism, economic issues (especially in the developing world) and democracy in the Middle East, are the tools available up to the task? In thinking about the tools for transatlantic cooperation, the meeting participants noted the need for the following: Invigorating NATO and defining its role. Robust peacekeeping? Policing? Fighting terrorism? Moving toward a more political organization? Out of area in the near abroad, or globally? Creating better mechanisms for EU-U.S. dialogue and cooperation. What mechanisms can be developed beyond the EU-U.S. Summits? How can those summits be strengthened? Creating informal networks to shape ideas: parliamentary, nongovernmental, and other channels of communication to give depth to the relationship, allow new ideas to develop. Are there informal groupings of governments (such as the Quad, Quint, Contact Group, Quartet) that could help the formal mechanisms be more effective? Undertaking UN reform. How can the UN Charter be adapted to address new threats? How can the UN promote and instill modern responsibilities to protect human rights? Assessing the role of the OSCE. Can this organization serve as a tool to repair the relationship? How could the OSCE be strengthened? Revamping the G8. Should its structures and mission be reassessed in light of the changing global security environment? Should new members be invited into G8 discussions? In some cases, auxiliary or totally new tools may be necessary to address the new challenges of the 21st century: international terrorism, the prevention of states' and non-state actors' possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), global policing and post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian intervention, and promotion of democracy and development in the developing world, including the Middle East. Before closing the meeting, the participants discussed the need to facilitate enhanced public diplomacy. How could the EU Delegation in Washington be strengthened? How could the U.S. Mission to the EU be enhanced? What other tools of public diplomacy could be developed?

WORKSHOP II: ASPEN, COLORADO JULY 31 THROUGH AUGUST 2, 2003
In the summer of 2003, the transatlantic relationship was just beginning to show signs of recovery after a bitter dispute over the war in Iraq. Sporadic accusations about the "unilateralist superpower" and "obstructionist Europe" were continuing to fly back and forth across the Atlantic; however, on the whole, tensions were easing. Declarations heralding the value of the relationship showed up in the opinion and editorial pages of major European and American newspapers, transatlantic exchanges were resumed, President Bush met with President Chirac and other world leaders in Evian, France, and a handful of high level transatlantic conferences and initiatives aimed at finding new common ground in the aftermath of Iraq were launched. In late July, the group, with the addition of a handful of "next generation" young leaders, reconvened to set to work on that task. A summary of their discussion follows.

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Aspen Atlantic Group

ASSESSING THE CURRENT TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
The Aspen meeting began with a question: Can the transatlantic security architecture adequately fit the needs of the 21st century? Are the institutions that were built four or five decades ago equipped to tackle post 9/11 threats such as catastrophic terrorism, radical fundamentalism, and weapons of mass destruction? To be sure, many international institutions such as NATO, the EU, the UN and the OSCE, among others, have worked hard in recent years to adjust to the changing needs of the new global security environment. Some, like NATO, have gone thousands of miles "out of area" and developed new mechanisms for crisis management and peace operations. Others, like the EU, have crafted new security strategies and launched new counter-terrorism initiatives. Nevertheless, today's security challenges continue to put an enormous strain on most of the international and regional institutions that were created during the cold war. Few participants, though, advocated the dismantling of the current transatlantic architecture in the name of creating a brand new set of institutions. Instead, participants stressed the need to examine closely and perhaps redefine many of the fundamental pillars upon which most international institutions have been built: State Sovereignty. For decades sovereignty was the building block of international relations. However, a rising number of humanitarian crises in the 1990s forced the international community to revisit the question of state sovereignty. Does the concept of state sovereignty need redefinition in an age when threats increasingly emanate from non-state actors? Should states and institutions have the right to intervene in the name of protecting an entire population from famine, oppression, or violence? Several participants stressed that any redefinition of state sovereignty should begin in the UN with an overhaul of the institution's structures. Legitimacy. For over 50 years, the UN has provided legitimacy for international interventions. The 1999 Kosovo intervention, however, undertaken without a UN mandate, challenged the primacy of the UN and left each side of the Atlantic with two different sets of assumptions and conclusions. Today, many European policymakers view the Kosovo intervention as an "exception," while many of their American colleagues believe that the Kosovo intervention was necessary to avoid total deadlock. The Iraq debate only highlighted these differences, with the United States prepared to take action without a UN mandate and Europeans adamantly opposed to an invasion without a UN blessing. Is a UN blessing always necessary? Can other international institutions such as NATO grant legitimacy? What are the consequences of intervening without a UN mandate? What are the consequences of inaction? Use of force. The Iraq war also highlighted longstanding transatlantic disagreements concerning the use of force. Europeans have a strong preference for "carrots" or soft security instruments when it comes to addressing major global challenges, while Americans tend to put a heavier reliance on "sticks." If consensus is not possible and diplomacy fails, when can force be utilized? Should there be "red lines" that states cannot cross without facing international action? How much do use of force debates hinder the international community's ability to enforce international law, arms control regimes, and other binding agreements? Multilateralism. Americans have challenged strongly the concept of multilateralism in recent years, arguing that today's multilateral institutions are ineffective, slow to act, and burdensome. Europeans, however, ask themselves if unilateralist policies or coalitions of the willing are indeed a viable alternative. Can the United States effectively address today's security challenges with allies but not alliances? What are the consequences of "going it alone?" Can the responsiveness of multilateral institutions be improved? 8 CROSSING
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Executive Summary In addition to examining the concepts listed above, participants focused closely on the EU-U.S. relationship. There was widespread agreement that the current mechanisms for fostering close EUU.S. ties are inadequate. For example, the EU-U.S. summits do not allow the two partners to address issues that require sustained engagement. The summits need to be revamped to create an interconnected, transatlantic policy planning process, one that would provide EU and U.S. officials with an opportunity to negotiate their positions in advance before they come to the table with hardened positions that leave little room for compromise. American participants closed the session by asking European colleagues about the future of the EU. Will, for example, the EU constitution enable the EU to act in a more timely way? American and Europeans both noted the EU's difficulty in making swift decisions, which often results in a strong U.S. preference for bilateral relationships when quick decisions are sought. Furthermore, many Americans noted that current EU efforts to both widen and deepen the Union are perceived as being "all consuming," often hindering the EU's ability to focus on regions and threats outside of its borders. "If the EU is under construction," asked one participant, "how do we keep the traffic going during that building period?"

EXAMINING THE GAP BETWEEN AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN THREAT PERCEPTIONS
Participants agreed that the gap between American and European threat perceptions did not begin to widen in the months leading up to the Iraq war but rather in the mid to late 1990s. While the United States was focusing on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other global threats in the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe was focusing on integration and stabilization in the Balkans. However, there are signs that Europe is catching up. Recent polling data shows large majorities of Europeans who are concerned about WMD, terrorism, and religious and ethnic hatred, although nuances do exist. The key question is how those nuances affect Europe and America's ability to address jointly the global threats they face. Recent developments inside the EU, including the Union's new security strategy and its WMD policy statement, offer a bright prognosis in terms of EU-U.S. cooperation. Furthermore, increased transatlantic cooperation in the area of homeland security suggests that the threat perception gap has not prevented Europe and the United States from creating common transatlantic counter-terrorism strategies. Despite these developments, however, there exists a strong need for Europe to invest in greater intelligence acquisition and threat assessment capabilities. In addition, some participants lobbied for greater debate among European publics about threat perceptions. Even when European experts agree with their American counterparts on the severity of the threat, the public rarely shares their concerns. Of all the threats that were discussed, Iran generated the greatest amount of disagreement. Europeans appear to be much more sympathetic to Iran's regional security concerns than Americans. Should Iran decide to go ahead and acquire nuclear capabilities, Europeans are skeptical that Iran would use those capabilities as war-fighting instruments. Conversely, American analysts view Iranian WMD acquisitions with a sharp sense of urgency and warn that such capabilities and know-how could be leaked to terrorist groups in the region intent on attacking either the United States or Israel. Many account for the tremendous differences in perceptions concerning Iran in part to Europe's stronger diplomatic, commercial, and historic ties to the country. Also, Europeans tend to assume CROSSING
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Aspen Atlantic Group that any country that might acquire nuclear weapons will show the same degree of restraint, logic and responsibility that prevailed in the two dominant nuclear powers during the cold war. Are Europeans simply more accustomed to living with such existential threats than Americans? Are Europeans more willing to accept the risks? While many participants agreed that the debate over how to address Iran's nuclear ambitions would likely bring added tension to the transatlantic relationship, there was broad agreement that the gap in American and European threat perceptions is not the most divisive factor in the relationship. In fact, America and Europe continue to share a wide range of views concerning threats to global stability. Therefore, it is not the threat perceptions themselves that trigger the greatest transatlantic divergences but rather the means to address the threats.

EVALUATING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Participants dedicated part of the day to a discussion on the Middle East and the inability of the transatlantic partners to craft an effective, common strategy for the region. Steven Everts, of the Centre for European Reform, presented his ideas on how the two sides of the Atlantic might develop a joint strategy for the Middle East. He outlined four key components: (1) a new bargain for handling Iraq based on a UN resolution and a commitment from war skeptics to commit troops; (2) an examination of the underlying political dynamics of the region (i.e., crisis of government, lack of democracy and human rights, etc); (3) a joint move by the United States and Europe for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement or stronger commitment to implementing the roadmap; and (4) a joint strategy for addressing Iran's nuclear ambitions. Everts focused primarily on the last two recommendations. He and other participants agreed that neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians were implementing their specific commitments of the road map. When this conference took place in late July, there were already signs that both the Israelis and the Palestinians were flirting with alternative courses of action, with Israel constructing a security fence and the Palestinians working to translate their demographic advantage into some sort of liberation in a broader Israeli-Palestinian configuration. Many agreed that such ideas were only recipes for continuing violence and conflict. Could the "Quartet" be strengthened? Are additional, transatlantic consultation mechanisms needed? Everts recommended that NATO consider sending troops to the region but only after securing an agreement from both sides and developing a UN framework for the action. Responses to this suggestion were mixed, and several American participants in favor debated whether or not the United States would be an appropriate leader of the force. Later in that session, the discussion returned its focus to Iran. While the two sides of the Atlantic have tried a variety of different strategies ranging from "critical engagement" to isolation, neither of them seems to be effective. While some U.S. administration officials have made no secret of their interest in regime change in Iran, most participants agreed that the United States should refrain from using military means to achieve that aim for multiple reasons. First, in the Europeans' view, the use of force against Iran would further open the Pandora's box of preemptive strikes, setting a dangerous, international precedent. Second, U.S. action in Iran would likely eliminate the possibility of reaching an international consensus on Iran and possibly other nuclear issues. European participants urged the Americans to work multilaterally, both through the UN and the IAEA to develop a common agenda that would acknowledge Iranian security concerns. 10 CROSSING
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Executive Summary

EXPLORING THE ISSUE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Former Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, opened the final session of the Aspen meeting with a briefing on an international commission of 18 strategic leaders he formed to examine the issue of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. He posed the questions: do leaders have right to do what they want inside their own borders? Should the international community have the right to intervene when a population is under threat or at risk? Does the international community have the necessary resources to conduct such interventions? Axworthy's commission concluded that the issue of state sovereignty must be redefined in today's modern age, not as a prerogative to exercise power based upon one's own calculations, but instead as the responsibility to protect. The fundamental guarantee of any government is the responsibility to protect its citizens.i2i If a government cannot protect its citizens, won't protect its citizens, or itself is the predator, then the international community does have some responsibility to act. However, Axworthy's commission believes that the threshold has to be high in order to prevent the international community from acting in response to minor violations. Determining that threshold might be conducted through a series of tests or criteria that have to be met. For example, what is the exact nature of the violation? What diplomatic, economic, and political alternatives have already been used? Does the international community have the means (rapidly deployable, interoperable sets of standby brigades or policing units that are regional located) available? What happens if there is an UNSC stalemate? Could there be a role for the UN General Assembly? Participants had a number of questions about the costs, feasibility, legality, and resources needed to create a new international standard for humanitarian intervention. Would one country always need to take the lead? Could mechanisms be developed that would enable the international community to react in a timely fashion? Would member states of the UN have the political will to create such mechanisms? Several participants also worried that a new model for humanitarian intervention might overcommit the international community, which undoubtedly has its limits. Virtually everyone agreed, however, that better standards and strategies must be created for rebuilding regions and nations after any form of military intervention. The proper planning, funding, and resources must be made available in order to ensure a peaceful and successful post-conflict reconstruction.

CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE
Due to the overwhelming positive response to the first two meetings and the fact that the transatlantic relationship continues to undergo a number of "growing pains" as it adapts to the postSeptember 11th security environment, the Aspen Atlantic Group is firmly committed to continuing its transatlantic dialogue in 2004. An upcoming meeting will include an in-depth examination of American and European policies vis--vis Iran. Although discord surrounding action in Iraq has been the most significant signal of recent disparity between the two continents' strategic philosophies, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic now argue that Iran, not Iraq, threatens to bring about the next wave of transatlantic tension to the relationship. Countering that challenge will require a vast amount of cooperation and strategic planning at a time when relations are already frayed and a number of official, diplomatic channels are broken down. The founding members of

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Aspen Atlantic Group the Aspen Atlantic Group strongly believe that their continuing series will provide a critical forum for key transatlantic leaders and "next generation" leaders to examine future challenges and chart new paths toward a renewed transatlantic partnership.

ENDNOTES
1 2 America's Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties: A Nine-Country Survey, Pew Global Attitudes Project, The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 18 March 2003. Axworthy recommends examining a broad range of factors when considering future international intervention, including environmental dangers, security threats, health hazards, whether or not the state in question might be harboring terrorists, and the democratic capacity of a state. That does not necessarily mean that the international community should have the right to punish non-democratic states but Axworthy recommends that it be at least one factor for consideration.

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DISCUSSANTS AND GUEST EXPERTS
WORKSHOP I WYE RIVER, MARYLAND JUNE 68, 2003 ASPEN ATLANTIC GROUP MEMBERS
Madeleine K. Albright United States, Principal, The Albright Group Lloyd Axworthy Canada, Director and CEO, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia Ismail Cem Turkey, President, New Turkey Party Erik Derycke Belgium, Judge, Constitutional Court of Belgium Lamberto Dini Italy, Vice President and Senator, Italian Senate Jaime Gama Portugal, Chairman of the European Affairs and Foreign Policy Committee, Portuguese Parliament Bronislaw Geremek Poland, Chair of European Civilization, College of Europe Nadezhda Mihaylova Bulgaria, Vice President of the European People's Party, Chair of the Union of Democratic Forces Hubert Vdrine France, Former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, French Government

KEYNOTE SPEAKER
Stephen Hadley, Deputy National Security Adviser, National Security Council

PARTICIPANTS
Antony Blinken, Staff Director, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Lael S. Brainard, New Century Chair, The Brookings Institution Kurt M. Campbell, Senior Vice President and Director of the International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Director, Aspen Strategy Group Jon S. Corzine, Senator, U.S. Senate Dieter Dettke, Executive Director, Friedrich Ebert Foundation Thomas E. Donilon, Executive Vice President, Law and Policy, Fannie Mae Corporation Jane Harman, Member of Congress, U.S. House of Representatives Sidney Harman, Chairman and CEO, Harman International Industries Walter Isaacson, President and CEO, The Aspen Institute Donald Kimelman, Director, Venture Fund, The Pew Charitable Trusts
Note: Titles and affiliations are current as of the date of the meeting.

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Andrew Kohut, Director, Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, The Pew Charitable Trusts Charles Kupchan, Senior Fellow and Director of Europe Studies, Council on Foreign Relations Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Dean and Professor of Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and Co-Chairman, Aspen Strategy Group James O'Brien, Principal, The Albright Group James Rubin, Visiting Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics Simon Serfaty, Director, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies Wendy Sherman, Principal, The Albright Group James B. Steinberg, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution

WORKSHOP II ASPEN, COLORADO JULY 31AUGUST 2, 2003 ASPEN ATLANTIC GROUP MEMBERS
Madeleine K. Albright United States, Principal, The Albright Group Lloyd Axworthy Canada, Director and CEO, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia Ismail Cem Turkey, President, New Turkey Party Robin Cook - United Kingdom, Member, British Parliament Erik Derycke Belgium, Judge, Constitutional Court of Belgium Lamberto Dini Italy, Vice President and Senator, Italian Senate Bronislaw Geremek Poland, Chair of European Civilization, College of Europe Nadezhda Mihaylova Bulgaria, Vice President of the European People's Party, Chair of the Union of Democratic Forces Jozias van Aartsen The Netherlands, Member of the Dutch Parliament, Leader of the Liberal Party VVD

KEYNOTE SPEAKER
General Klaus D. Naumann, Former Chairman of the North Atlantic Military Committee, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PARTICIPANTS
Frederick Barton, Senior Advisor, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies 14 C R O S S I N G ATL ANTIC

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Jacques Beltran, Senior Manager in Political Affairs and International Marketing, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company Stephen Biegun, Assistant to the Majority Leader for National Security Affairs, Office of the Majority Leader Lael S. Brainard, New Century Chair, The Brookings Institution Kurt M. Campbell, Senior Vice President and Director of the International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Director, Aspen Strategy Group Eliot A. Cohen, Professor, Johns Hopkins University/SAIS Richard N. Cooper, Professor, International Economics, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University Bathsheba Crocker, International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Affairs Kenneth W. Dam, Max Pam Professor of American & Foreign Law, University of Chicago Law School Troy Eid, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Personnel and Administration, Office of the Governor of Colorado Steven Everts, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for European Reform Dennis Fitzgibbons, Director of Public Policy, DaimlerChrysler Walter Isaacson, President and CEO, The Aspen Institute David Lipton, Managing Director, Moore Capital Strategy Group Judith Miller, Senior Writer, The New York Times Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Dean and Professor of Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and Co-Chairman, Aspen Strategy Group Thomas O'Gara, Chairman, Kroll-O'Gara Company William J. Perr y, Professor, School of Engineering and Institute for International Studies, Stanford University Thomas R. Pickering, Senior Vice President for International Relations, The Boeing Company Susan E. Rice, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution Wendy Sherman, Principal, The Albright Group Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security & Cooperation, Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project Julianne Smith, Fellow and Deputy Director, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies James B. Steinberg, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution John Thornton, Senior Advisor and Director, Goldman Sachs Foundation

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WORKSHOP I

Workshop I

AN ELECTIVE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP FOR THE 21ST CENTURY*
JAMES B. STEINBERG VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

INTRODUCTION
As the G-8 leaders gather in Evian, the formal agenda is little more than a backdrop to a far more compelling drama: the first face-to-face encounter of the transatlantic Iraq war antagonists. From all corners there are protestations of a desire to heal the transatlantic rift and move on to common challenges, but lingering bitterness on both sides and suspicion of each other's long-term intentions have put a question mark over the prospect of a happy ending to the play. For commentators who had long been predicting that strategic divergence between the United States and Europe would follow the end of the Cold War, the dust-up over Iraq was inevitable, and foreshadowed persistent divisions in the years to come. The optimists pointed instead to the backing the United States received from the vast majority of Europe's leaders (if not their publics) and hopefully suggested that it was France and Germany, not the United States, which was isolated. As with most debates, each side brings an element of truth to the argument. Perhaps even more important, which side proves more "right" in the long-term depends as much on the choices U.S. and European leaders make today as it does on the relative force of long-term trends that are both pulling us together and pushing us apart. This is not the first time in our histories that the transatlantic bargain has been stressed.1 But there is reason to believe that the new challenges facing the United States and Europe are qualitatively different from those that have vexed us in the past. To understand how we can go forward together, we first need to begin by understanding the underlying causes of tensions in the relationship as well as the nature of the challenges which we will both face in the future, and how the United States and Europe both stand to gain from an effort to reinvent our relationship for the years to come.

FROM COLD WAR TO GLOBAL WORLD: THE EVOLUTION OF TRANSATLANTIC TIES
During the second half of the twentieth century, the transatlantic axis lay at the heart of the world's political and economic relations. The fault line of the strategic competition between the Soviet Union and the West stretched across central and southeastern Europe. Managing the nuclear standoff was the dominant, and most consequential, challenge of that time. Although most of the
* This paper is based on an essay that appeared in the Summer 2003 issue of Survival, "An Elective Partnership: Salvaging Transatlantic Relations." That essay was prepared with the generous support of the Bertelsmann Foundation within the framework of the Future of the Transatlantic Project by the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Center for Applied Policy Studies (CAP) and their larger transatlantic initiative on security and on economics, finance and trade.

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Aspen Atlantic Group "hot wars" of the era took place far from Europe's shores, in proxy conflicts from north- and southeast Asia to Africa and Central America, each of them was linked more or less directly to the EastWest competition. Western Europe's first steps toward integration were intimately connected to the need to build and maintain the military and economic strength to counter Soviet power, and received support from the United States for that very reason. Security was not the only link. The United States and Europe were each other's preferred trading partners and Europe remained the most important investor for the United States. A transatlantic political elite with close personal ties cemented during the Second World War and the postwar reconstruction period dominated politics and foreign policy-making on both sides of the Atlantic. These links were underpinned on the popular level by large-scale European migration to the United States from the mid-1800s through the mid-1900s, which provided ethnic and cultural bonds. As the world's oldest, most established liberal democracies, we shared common values rooted in the Enlightenment. Yet even in the depths of the Cold War, forces were at work loosening these bonds. Trade was the first obvious sign of a shift. Intra-hemispheric trade took on increasing importance for both the United States and Europe, while transpacific flows also grew in importance.2 Europeans also realized that to compete on a global level, they would have to find new economic efficiencies through scale a goal that could only be achieved through the deeper integration that culminated in the 1986 Single European Act. With the movement in goods and services came a new movement of peoples. U.S. immigration became dominated by flows from Latin America and Asia, while in Europe, a new wave of immigrants from the Arab and Islamic world and South Asia began to transform Europe's cities. These changes accelerated with a vengeance following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its external empire in Eastern and Central Europe. The core existential threat that brought the United States and Europe together simply melted away, while the barrier that kept Europe apart similarly dissolved. The 1990s saw struggles to cope with the immediate political and economic fallout of this remarkable shift ranging from the virulent wars in the Balkans, to the economic and political challenge of German unification, the transformation of the former communist societies in central and eastern Europe, and the rapprochement with Russia itself. By the beginning of the 21st century, however, Europe seemed within grasp of a "zone of peace." A European Union (EU) of 25 members will, by 2004, form its core. Integration within the EU has proceeded apace, with the establishment of the European Monetary Union, and closer political coordination under the Maastricht Treaty leading to the Common Foreign and Security Policy and "third pillar" cooperation in Justice and Home affairs. The EU's energies will be largely focused on consolidating these achievements, while coping with the political and economic stresses on the social welfare state that has been exacerbated by a generation of immigration from the Mahgreb and beyond. The world changed rapidly in the 1990s for the United States too, but in very different ways. It appeared at first that the United States would also turn inward, a sentiment reflected in James Baker's infamous "we don't have a dog in that fight" observation concerning the Balkans and candidate Bill Clinton's "it's the economy, stupid" slogan for wresting the presidency from George H. W. Bush. But then the forces of change began to draw the United States outward. Growing dependence on foreign trade and investment put international economics at the center of the foreign policy agenda, from the completion of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Uruguay Round, through trade frictions with Japan and managing the global fallout from the Asian financial crisis of 19971998, to the integration of China into the World Trade Organization. 20 C R O S S I N G
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James B. Steinberg While the end of the Cold War initially brought a heightened sense of security to the United States, it quickly became clear to policymakers and the public that new kinds of threats not linked to powerful states, but closely associated with the new forces of globalization that were erasing boundaries between countries could prove equally daunting. Although these threats ranged from the proliferation of international criminal and drug organizations to infectious disease and environmental harm, it became increasingly clear to Americans that the threat of terrorism from the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, through the attacks on U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, to the embassy bombings in Africa in 1998 and the attack on the U.S.S Cole in 2000 was the number one enemy of the new age, a designation that was cemented by the attacks on September 11, 2001. The consequences for U.S. foreign policy of viewing counter-terrorism as the "organizing principle" of the United States' national security strategy have been profound. In the immediate aftermath of September 11th, President Bush, in a speech to the U.S. Congress, announced that henceforth U.S. relations with other countries would be judged by whether they were "with us or [...] with the terrorists."3 This doctrine has had direct consequences for the way the United States has approached its relationships with key international partners. For example, during his presidential campaign, then-candidate Bush took a skeptical view of the importance of U.S.-Russian relations and a confrontational stance toward China, which his campaign labeled a "strategic competitor." Following September 11th, these relationships underwent a sea-change. Both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin were granted visits to Bush's ranch in Crawford, and the new National Security Strategy announced that for the first time in history, all of the great powers were on the "same side" a claim that would have seemed puzzling on September 10, 2001. Initially, the terrorist attacks appeared to revive the United States' ties with traditional allies in both Europe and East Asia, who quickly sided with the U.S. following the attacks. But in the initial phase of the campaign in Afghanistan, despite NATO's immediate invocation of Article 5, the U.S. government appeared to accord a secondary role at best to NATO or even to individual allies. Over time, however, the United States began to see both the political and operational benefit of Alliance support. The allies' involvement both in military operations and peacekeeping in Afghanistan began to grow. These developments culminated in the decision to give NATO formal command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul in 2003, in NATO's November 2002 Prague Summit commitment to play a greater role in counter-terrorism, and even in the exploration of possible NATO involvement in supporting a military operation in Iraq. From the U.S. point of view, the problem of global terrorism directed at the United States was compounded by the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which itself was in part driven by the diffusion of technology through globalization. The spread of information technology made it increasingly difficult to control the flow of WMD know-how, while ever more porous borders made the smuggling of dangerous materials easier. The danger that terrorists would acquire WMD increased the Bush administration's predisposition to unilateralism. In its eyes, the threat to the U.S. was so great that it would be irresponsible to rely heavily on others and particularly on international institutions and international law. America's growing military, spurred on by dramatic increases in the defense budget after September 11th, also seemed to make the unilateral option more plausible. This growing capability and the heightened sense of danger led to a growing emphasis, at least in rhetoric, on pre-emption and preventive war as tools in America's strategy. While the United States was not adverse to help from others, the administration was not prepared to compromise either its means or its objectives CROSSING
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Aspen Atlantic Group in order to preserve its historical alliances. "Sovereignty" in the form of freedom of action for the United States became a touchstone, while "sovereignty" in the form of non-interference in the territory of others was increasingly subordinated to the United States' perceived need to act against emerging threats. Europe's response to the challenge of globalization has differed markedly from that of the United States. Europeans have focused on the relative impotence of individual states in the face of global challenges, and the imperative of cooperation. This imperative had its roots in Europe's own evolution to more cooperative arrangements that involved the pooling of sovereignty. Coupled with this willingness to curb individual EU countries' freedom of action was an increasing focus on universally binding norms and institutions. The U.S. rejection of the Kyoto Climate Change Treaty crystallized a long-running dispute between Europe and the United States over a series of international agreements, ranging from the International Criminal Court and the Landmines Treaty, to efforts to enhance verification of the Biological Weapons Convention and to limit the spread of small arms. The difference in perspectives on how to meet global challenges could be seen in the European response to the 9/11 attacks. Although EU governments and publics wholeheartedly empathized with the United States, they put considerable emphasis on the importance of collective action to address the threat (as evidenced by support for actions at the United Nations and in NATO), and grew increasingly wary of what was perceived to be the unilateral U.S. response. The divergence was compounded by a perception that the United States was relying primarily on a military strategy to defeat terrorism, rather than focusing on political, diplomatic and economic measures. Europeans believed that the United States was failing to address terrorism's underlying causes, including lack of political and economic opportunity in the Muslim world, and most importantly, the U.S. failure to play a more assertive role in addressing the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Europeans welcomed the formation of the Quartet, which gave both the EU and the UN (along with the U.S. and Russia) a more formal role in the Middle East peace process. But the U.S. refusal to challenge the Sharon government remained a source of serious division, even with key U.S. allies such as the United Kingdom. In many ways, these differences came to a head over the issue of what to do about Iraq. For the Bush administration, the existential threat posed by the possibility that Saddam Hussein might share weapons of mass destruction with terrorists justified regime change, preferably with the support of the UN and allies, but alone if necessary. For some European governments, and large sections of the European public, resort to force was impermissible without UN authorization and the unsanctioned use of force by the United States against Iraq was a greater danger to global stability than an Iraqi regime which continued to defy UN Security Council Resolutions. The German government took its opposition to the United States to its farthest extreme refusing to support the use of force even with UN endorsement. This deep disagreement has convinced some that the United States and Europe have come to a real parting of ways, both in their diagnosis of the nature of the challenges facing them and in their prescriptions. This view was articulated in its most stark form by Robert Kagan, in his article "Power and Weakness,"4 but has been echoed in various ways by others. For Kagan, Europeans' mistrust of hard power and excessive faith in the rule of law and consensus has opened an unbridgeable strategic gap with the United States, and rendered Europe incapable of effectively addressing the Hobbesian challenges of terror and rogue states. This pessimism is flawed, for two key reasons. First, in the age of globalization, most Americans

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James B. Steinberg recognize that even with the United States' great military and economic dominance, we cannot secure our key national objectives without the support of others. Second, most Europeans understand and accept that the rule of law and international institutions alone are insufficient to meet many of the most pressing global challenges, and despite the strengthening of the EU, they continue to value the United States as a partner. The confluence of these two factors provides a fresh basis for reaching a new transatlantic understanding on the core political and economic issues facing us, despite the tensions that seem so overwhelming today. Yet, to achieve this goal, the United States and Europe must meet two key tests. In the security realm, their joint challenge is to identify core elements of a common vision of threats and opportunities, and strengthen the means of cooperation to address common goals. In the broader political and economic sphere, the United States and Europe must together lead the effort to build the structures of international governance that are necessary to address the transnational challenges of the 21st century.

REBUILDING SECURITY COOPERATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: COMMON GOALS AND COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES
Common Goals
On both an objective and a subjective level, there are strong reasons to believe that the security challenges facing the United States and Europe are more shared than divergent, because most stem from global trends that affect us all. The most dramatic case is terrorism. The threat from terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda to Europe is not identical to the one facing the United States. The United States, as the self-proclaimed and widely regarded champion of Western values, as well as the sole superpower, with a far more dominant presence in the Arab and Islamic world, is a more attractive target for terrorists. But such events as the attack on a French tanker in the Persian Gulf and French workers in Pakistan, the October 2002 bombing of a Bali discotheque frequented by foreigners, as well as pronouncements from Al Qaeda leaders themselves, make clear that Europe and other Western democracies are also threatened. Moreover, the global network of the terrorist organizations puts their activities at the heart of Western societies, and utilizes the tools of modern Western society financial institutions, the Internet, global transportation networks to carry out their work. Closely related is our common interest in halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction. This is most clear in the case of the possible acquisition of WMD by terrorists. It also applies to proliferation among states, both because these states might intentionally or unintentionally provide WMD capability to terrorists, and because the spread of WMD threatens to turn regional conflicts into wars that could have global consequences. This commonality of threats is clearly perceived by publics on both sides of the Atlantic. Last year's German Marshall Fund (GMF) -Chicago Council on Foreign Relations poll published shortly before the Iraq crisis heated up in summer 2002 showed that Europeans and Americans "have common views of threats and the distribution of power in the world."5 Specifically, the poll found that both Europeans and Americans placed international terrorism and Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction at the top of their list of perceived threats, with the threat of Islamic fundamentalism not far behind. As late as December 2002, a substantial majority of the publics in Germany (82%), France (67%) and the UK (86%) viewed Saddam Hussein as a "great" or "moderate" threat and believed he should be removed rather than disarmed.6 CROSSING ATL ANTIC 23

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Aspen Atlantic Group There are other important, shared security interests as well. The transformation of Russia into a stable, cooperative member of the international community is a priority for both the United States and Europe. The reasons include the need to reduce the risk that dangerous Soviet-era WMD materials will fall into the wrong hands, prevent the spread of conflict along Russia's periphery (which could destabilize neighboring countries and provide havens for terrorists) and ensure that Russia does not adopt revanchist ambitions as its economy and society begin to recover from the Soviet and post-Soviet meltdown. The United States and Europe also have an interest in promoting a stable, democratic and law-abiding Ukraine, which otherwise risks becoming an important source of WMD technology and material transfers and a haven for international criminal organizations. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, we share a stake in promoting political and economic transformation and integrating these states into larger communities, like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, lest this region become a refuge for, and source of, terrorism and instability. Similarly, we both have a stake in completing the integration of the Balkans, not only to prevent regional conflict reigniting, but also to deprive terrorists and international criminals of a foothold. Finally, both Europe and the U.S. have a stake in the successful emergence of a secular, democratic and prosperous Turkey, both as a model for other countries in the Islamic world and as a bulwark against the spread of anti-Western Islamic militancy. This does not mean that there are no differences between American and European security interests, actual and perceived. Although security challenges are increasingly global in character, geography has not entirely lost its relevance. U.S. security interests in East Asia, including treaty alliances with Japan and Korea, and a strong historical connection to Taiwan, mean that the United States will hav