War and Anxieties.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------The Washington Times www.washingtontimes.com -------------------------------------------------------------------------------War and Anxieties By William Taylor Published December 12, 2005, p. A29 The gut-wrenching charges and counter charges about the war in Iraq have been capturing headlines and prime time TV and radio at home and abroad. Our nation appears severely divided and in crisis. So what's new when it comes to the American approach to war? Not much. Anyone who has studied the history of American foreign policy should understand that we Americans have very strong characteristics in our approach to national security in general and toward "war" (whatever that means nowadays) in particular. Although there are historical exceptions, in general Americans traditionally have focused most of our energy on the pursuit of domestic affairs and private interests and, consequently, have viewed international and national security as secondary, if we thought of it at all. On the other hand, once persuaded there was a threat, American attitudes have tended to shift quickly and dramatically to support a war ­ as long as we were told what victory would look like and could see meaningful, rapid measures of progress toward objectives. Once surrender documents were signed in World War I and World War II or an armistice agreement in the Korean War, we impatient Americans wanted to "Bring the boys home" and get back to business as usual. World War I began in Europe in 1914, but America avoided involvement until 1917-despite the 1915 German U-boat sinking of the Lusitania that killed 128 Americans -when repeated violations of American neutral rights and revelations of German plots in Mexico ended a great debate about U.S. involvement in a European war. Then, feeling we had been stabbed in the back, America came on with a vengeance to fight "A War to End All Wars" under the popular slogan "Remember the Lusitania." Americans were given a definition of victory ­ surrender by Germany ­ and could visualize progress toward victory as the horrible trench warfare moved across Europe toward Berlin. World War II began in Europe in 1939, but the U.S. again avoided involvement until Japan, part of `the Axis," stabbed us in the back at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii on December 7, 1941. Under the slogan "Remember Pearl Harbor," we Americans entered another

crusade to rid the world of evil. Again, victory was defined as surrender by Japan and Germany, and progress could be measured by Gen. George Patton's tanks dashing across Europe after the Normandy landing and Gen. Douglas MacArthur's island hopping in the Pacific toward Japan. Unlike previous wars abroad, we slid slowly and grudgingly into the war in Vietnam in the early 1960's ostensibly to prevent countries in Southeast Asia from becoming dominoes falling under the yoke of communism. President Johnson tried to demonstrate in 1964 that America had been stabbed in the back by the fabricated attack of Vietnamese gunboats against the USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin. Americans were not persuaded and they were not in a crusading spirit. We did not have a clear definition of victory in counterinsurgency war and were given surrogate measures of progress such as Viet Cong "body count" to off-set TV images of the escalating flow of American "body bags" coming home. After more than a decade of war in Vietnam with no end in sight, and with more than 58,000 killed and 155,000 wounded, Americans just plain "called it quits" via congressional denial of further financial assistance to South Vietnam in early 1975. The vitriolic debate about the war, the anti-war protests and draftdodging took their psychological toll on those of us fighting in Vietnam, leading eventually to a great American general stating that he was a chief of staff presiding over a "hollow Army." In early 1991, after the longest, bitter foreign policy debate in U.S. history, Congress passed a bill (by 5 votes in the Senate) supporting a U.N. security council resolution which authorized a U.S.-led coalition to use all necessary means (including force) to expel Iraq from Kuwait--a clear and simple goal. With the most modern weapons in the world and employing "shock and awe" tactics, the coalition routed Saddam's forces quickly. There was no need for the Bush 1 Administration to prove what was obvious-progress toward objectives. Our forces suffered 148 killed and 467 wounded. Our troops came home proudly to ticker-tape parades in their honor. Our armed forces were the best in the world and everyone knew it. Americans did not need much persuasion that we were stabbed in the back by terrorists on September 11, 2001. President Bush made a powerful public case and we were ready to go to war against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan to support all kinds of homeland security initiatives, domestic and foreign, then to go to war against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. But, we Americans predictably have become impatient with the war. American soldiers are being killed and wounded daily in the name of bringing democracy to the Middle East. At home, democracy is at work in the electoral process moving toward 2006. Beyond allegations that the Bush Administration deceived us in going to war, Democrats are focusing on how badly the Administration is managing the whole effort. They want to know what victory would look like if we ever got there and they demand measures of progress. Analogies to Vietnam and "quagmires" increasingly appear in the media. Public opinion has been divided concerning the war.

Finally, the Bush Administration has gauged the seriousness of the situation and the need to inform the American public and blunt attacks by the Democrats. President Bush responded admirably in his carefully-crafted Annapolis speech detailing goals, objectives and strategy for the war in Iraq, buttressed by measures of progress. Perhaps we can move now from acrimonious charges and countercharges to legitimate debates about the Iraq War--which need not become "another Vietnam."

* William Taylor is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and an adjunct professor at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service.