As anticipated, Japan’s Cabinet has reinterpreted the constitution to permit Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense.
On July 1 the cabinet of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe introduced defense policy reforms, including measures that would allow Japan’s Self Defense Forces (SDF) to exercise the right of collective self-defense and aid allies under attack.
The Burke Chair at CSIS has developed a new analysis of the trends in Chinese military strategy and forces entitled Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development: Chinese and Outside Perspectives. This report provides a comprehensive update of previous Burke Chair studies and is available on the CSIS web site at http://csis.org/files/publication/140702_Chinese_MilBal.pdf .
On June 30, Chinese official media announced that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had expelled Xu Caihou from its ranks. The decision was taken earlier in the day by a meeting of the CCP Politburo chaired by President and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, according to the official bulletin.
Throughout the postwar period, the Government of Japan‟s (GOJ) definition and interpretation of collective self-defense and Article 9 of Japan‟s constitution have played a crucial role in how its leaders develop and employ military power. This issue also has had significant implications for its political and security relationship with the United States.
On June 24, the Japanese government issued a new “Japan Revitalization Strategy,” a blueprint of proposed structural reforms designed to boost the long-term growth potential of the world’s third-largest economy. This is the Abe administration’s second attempt to launch the “third arrow” of its comprehensive economic reform plan known as Abenomics (the first two arrows being monetary easing and fiscal stimulus) and builds on an initial growth strategy released one year ago. The markets expressed disappointment with the June 2013 package, but the reaction to this new version thus far has been generally positive with the Nikkei 225 index continuing to hover around a five-month high. Attention will now focus on how thoroughly the package of reforms is implemented.
With less than two weeks before the July 9 presidential elections in Indonesia, polls suggest that the two candidates, former Special Forces general Prabowo Subianto and former Jakarta governor Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, are now in a statistical dead heat. But regardless of which candidate prevails, the new president will face a daunting set of challenges when he takes office in October.
In June 2012 I wrote PacNet #34 “China. There, I said it” in an effort to generate a conversation about how the United States was publicly discussing the competitive elements of its relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The following remarks were delivered at the Japan-US Security Seminar: Public Panel Session at CSIS in Washington, DC on March 21, 2014. China needs to be approached in a holistic, comprehensive way. When we look into its diplomacy, security, politics, and/or economics, we find that they are closely linked to each other.
Proposed in the early 2000s by US researchers in response to Chinese investment in ports along the Indian Ocean littoral, the ‘string of pearls’ theory argued that China may be planning to develop overseas naval bases in South Asia to support extended naval deployments.