16th ASEAN Summit: Families Are Messy But Important

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is like a big family, and it has issues. When you set a table for 11, in this case the 10 leaders of the ASEAN countries—Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam—plus the ASEAN secretary general, you are bound to have some drama. That was certainly the case in Hanoi over the last three days.

The key message from the summit in Hanoi is that no one can forget that ASEAN is made up of 10 countries, and each one of them has its own problems. But the group is vitally important to its members and to international partners.

Although Vietnam, one of the most forthright advocates for a strong ASEAN, did a remarkable job in organizing the summit in terms of logistics, the gathering was characteristically messy. Thai prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva didn’t show up—he has thousands of protesters in the streets of Bangkok urging him to dissolve his government and seek a new electoral mandate; Philippine lame-duck president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo almost went home early but then changed her mind and decided to stay; Burmese prime minister Thein Sein was the primary object of the “family’s” attention, receiving very strong encouragement to create real political space in upcoming elections. These examples are the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen has publicly criticized the Thai secretary general for not being able to represent the collective membership—no surprise given Thai-Cambodia tensions. The dynamic is, well, dynamic.

So the question is whether this family delivers any real value to its collective members and to the global community. The answer is overwhelmingly “yes.” Many analysts criticize ASEAN on its effectiveness. Indeed Singaporean prime minister Lee Hsien Loong pilloried the organization for not acting decisively enough. But the truth is that ASEAN is a family that means something to its members and to the world’s major powers.

While Burmese and Thai protests predictably stole headlines in Hanoi, ASEAN is quietly making real progress on integrating its 10 countries, 620 million denizens, and $1.3-trillion economy. The blueprint for integration is the ASEAN Charter, which lays out goals for economic, sociocultural, and security/political integration by 2015. The ASEAN Summit quietly marked some real progress toward these goals, and a superficial understanding of those trends is inimical to good policy in regard to Southeast Asia.

On the economic and financial front, ASEAN has effectively established its ASEAN Free Trade Area. Over 95 percent of goods move between ASEAN countries without tariffs. Intra-ASEAN trade has moved from second-largest to become the largest market for members in the last decade. Finance ministers of ASEAN and the +3 nations—China, Japan, and Korea—have initiated the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM), which creates a useful $120-billion currency swap and crisis management facility for regional economies. Customs harmonization and financial services liberalization are also making serious gains.

The ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) will take place in May in Vietnam. What had been a quiet meeting of military chiefs of staff has now been elevated to the ministerial level. The ADMM will consider whether to invite “+X” countries to join their discussions regarding regional security. The United States and big East Asian nations to the north are clearly interested in being invited, as are Australia and New Zealand.

An ASEAN dispute resolution mechanism and human rights body have also been established, and while these are nascent institutions, they are significant early steps in the right direction. The United States would be unwise to join cynical voices criticizing their effectiveness. The harder but effective policy course is to get engaged and invest in strengthening these institutions, participate at senior levels in ASEAN integration efforts, and follow through on significant U.S. national interests in Southeast Asia. The U.S. stake in the region is notoriously underreported. These interests include investment three times as large as in China, a pair of treaty allies (the Philippines and Thailand), some of the world’s most important shipping lanes and naval rights of way, key partners in counterterror efforts, vital links to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and mitigating the impacts of climate change.

ASEAN is a family—and a messy one—but it is vitally important to its members and its neighbors. It is likely to play a central role in any Asian regional architecture from trade and economics to security and defense. Having a strong foundation in ASEAN is key to the long-term management of relations with major global partners China and India. ASEAN’s path won’t be linear. It will be colored by headline-grabbing drama that will test even the most well-grounded strategy, but the United States has keen interests in close relations with ASEAN. America is a friend of this family, and helping it be strong is an investment in our national interest.

Ernest Z. Bower is a senior adviser and director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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