Afghanistan and the Uncertain Metrics of Progress: Part Five: Building Effective Afghan Forces

The war in Afghanistan is now in its tenth year. In spite of that fact, the US, allied countries, ISAF, and the UN have failed to develop credible reporting in the progress of the war, provide meaningful transparency on the problems and challenge it faces, and a meaningful plan for the future. Moreover, since June 2010, the unclassified reporting the US does provide has steadily shrunk in content – effectively “spinning” the road to victory by eliminating content that illustrates the full scale of the challenges ahead.

Drawing on Unclassified Official Reporting Lacking in Credibility and Transparency

The US is scarcely alone in failing to provide adequate reporting on the Afghan conflict. No allied government provides credible reporting on the progress of the war, and the Afghan government provides little detail of any kind. The UN, which has major responsibilities for aid, has failed to provide a meaningful overview of how aid requirements are generated, how aid efforts are managed and coordinated, of how funds are used, of the quality of fiscal controls and auditing, and of the effectiveness and impact of aid.

There are, however, some useful unclassified metrics in spite of the tendency to limit their content “spin” and “message control.” Moreover, some reflect real progress since the adoption of the new strategy for the war, and indicate a more frank, meaningful, and open reporting system would do a far more convincing job of winning support for the conflict – as well as be a way of obtaining the kind of feedback and informed criticism that could help meet the many problems and challenges that still shape the course of the fighting.

The Six Part Analysis of the War

The Burke Chair has prepared a six-part analytic overview of unclassified metrics, and of their current content relates to the challenges in policy, plans, resources, and management of the war that now reduce the prospects of victory. It should be stressed that such an analysis is only a way of flagging key trends and developments within the limits imposed by using unclassified official reporting.

Moreover, metrics are not a substitute for the kind of narrative that is critical to understand the complexity of this war, and put numbers, charts, and maps in context. This is a case where facing the real-world complexity of the conflict is essential to winning it.

Even an overview of the strengths and weakness of unclassified metrics does, however, provide considerable insight into what is known about the war, and the many areas where meaningful reporting is lacking and the reporting available is deceptive and misleading. The US, its allies, and ISAF may currently be repeating the same kind of overall messaging as the “follies” presented in Vietnam, but there are enough areas where facts still become public to put much of the war into perspective.

The first two reports in this series have already been circulated and are now available on the CSIS web site. They are entitled:

• Part One: The Failures that Shaped Today’s War  (Available on the CSIS web site at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110215_AfghanMetrics.pdf): This report highlights the US failure to resource the Afghan campaign, and the extent to which US failure to react to the growth of the Taliban, the al Qa’ida sanctuary in Pakistan, and the failures of the Afghan government turned near victory into near defeat.
• Part Two: Transitioning to the New Strategy  (Available on the CSIS web site at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110215_Afghan_Metrics_part_two.pdf): This briefing highlights graphics and tables that summarize the new strategy and campaign plan, the initial impact of the result build-up of US forces and changes in tactics and strategy on the intensity of the war, and early estimates of how the changes in strategy will impact on the US budget and the affordability of the war.
• Part Three: Key Ongoing Challenges (Available on the CSIS web site at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110228_Afghan_Metrics.pdf): This report highlights the unclassified graphics and tables that describe key individual challenges that affect the course of the fighting and the ability to implement the new strategy.
• Part Four: Hold and Build, and the Challenge of Development, and is available on the CSIS web site at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110301_AfghanMetrics_part4.pdf): This report highlights the progress and challenges in what remains the weakest link in the US and allied effort in Afghanistan: Developing integrated civil-military operations, making effective use of aid, and making “hold, build, and transition” a functional reality.

Part Five:  Hold and Build, and the Challenge of Development

The Fifth report is now available. It is entitled Part Five: Building Effective Afghan Forces, and is available on the CSIS web site at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110308_Afghan_Metrics_part5.pdf): This report highlights the progress and challenges in creating the Afghan national security forces necessary to defeat the Taliban and other insurgents and allow a transition in which Afghanistan assumes responsibility for most military, internal security and police action.

The metrics in this section portray major progress in proving adequate funding for the Afghan National Security Forces, (ANSF) and in creating an effective training base and operation to support the creation of forces necessary to do the job. The data  also reflect one of the only areas where ISAF provides meaningful detail and transparency on the current progress of the war – reporting further supported by the Department of Defense semi-annual reports on the war.

At the same time, it also reflects severe problems in the Afghan force development effort that raise serious questions as to whether these forces can have the strength and quality to support removal of most US and other ISAF forces in 2014.

Shaping Transition: Creating an Effective ANSF and Laying the Groundwork for Transition

The charts on aid spending at the start of this report show that no serious effort was made to fund the creation of the ANSF until FY2007, that these funding streams were erratic in FY2008, and funding of the scale of effort required did not begin until FY2010 – nearly a decade after the war began. This gross strategic negligence was compounded by a failure to provide even minimally adequate numbers of trainers until CY2010, and a matching failure to provide adequate basic equipment and facilities.

The responsibility for these failures lies largely with the US and occurred at the highest level of US national security decision-making in spite of warnings and requests from at least one US Ambassador and senior commander.

A matching failure may also be coming. A political emphasis on getting enough Afghan forces for  “transition” in 2011-2014 tends to force an emphasis on numbers, rather than force quality and creating a force that can retain the manpower it needs and operate without major US and ISAF support. Moreover, this form of transition omits the fact that the US and NATO must fund the ANSF indefinitely into the future and well beyond 2020. This risks becoming a “worst of both worlds” approach to creating and funding a lasting ANSF capability.

Shaping Transition: Racing Towards Larger Forces

The creation of effective Afghan forces is critical to providing security and the “clear and hold” phase of the war on a national level. It is equally critical to allowing “build” to provide stability, prompt justice, governance, and a functioning economy, as well as some form of transition where Afghan forces replace US and ISAF forces. 

The charts in this section show impressive progress in setting force goals large enough to do the job and in creating larger force numbers. They also, however, show how rushed the basic training process is, how critical it is to have highly qualified trainers, and that a force expansion this large depends on partner units to provide the experience and mentoring necessary to make up for so rushed a training process.

More detailed NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) data also show that attrition is still a major problem in spite of recent pay increases – in part because forces are overcommitted and have not had proper opportunity for leave and recovery/follow-on training.

Metrics and analyses that emphasize numbers, rather than quality and the creation of forces with high retention rates and lasting capability, are a dangerous form of “spin.” These pressures also only become apparent after regular training is completed. They make it absolutely essential to objectively measure quality and retention once units are in the field, and make the results transparent so they can be used to plan a workable and enduring transition.

Shaping Transition: A Crisis in Trainer Numbers and Quality and No Meaningful Data on Partners

 NTM-A has set up what seems to be solid training base for creating the kind of Afghan National Army needed for transition. As its data show, however, it is drastically short of the trainers it needs to succeed. Moreover, it is counting pledged trainers as if they were in-theater, and it is clear from the NTM-A figures that getting the right trainer quality will be more critical than simply increasing trainer numbers.

NTM-A does report some progress since the metrics in this section were issued, but much of this progress is in the number of pledged trainers, rather than trainers actually on the scene. It still seems to be short over 40% of critical trainers and over 60% of trainers overall – even if ISAF military with no prior training experience are counted as trainers. Moreover, time is critical as long as either 2010 or 2014 are treated as any form of deadline.

The data on these areas for the regular armored forces are not matched by similar detailed reporting on trainers for the various elements of the police forces.

Moreover, NTM-A is not responsible for partnering, and counting the quality of partners and partnering efforts. This is a critical omission in the metrics available on the ANSF.

Shaping Transition: The Afghan National Army (ANA): Much Better Data on Numbers than Quality and Endurance

Recent reports show a steady growth in the size of the Afghan Army and Air Force, and in many key qualitative aspects of formal training. The critical problem is that there is no matching mix of transparent, credible metrics and narratives on the quality and effectiveness of any element of Afghan forces once they leave formal training and enter the field, and no meaningful data on the quality of the partnering they need to succeed.

The effectiveness measures that are reported on the ANA measure formal training and equipment resources and not performance in the field.  Uncertain loyalties, ties to power brokers, retention and attrition problems, and corruption are not addressed. A new rating system is supposed to have been developed, but its value and realism is not yet clear, and there are reports that provinces are being rate – sometimes favorably – on the basis of grossly inadequate coverage of a few districts.

The current and projected real world capability to support the new strategy and support transition is not rated or analyzed in objective terms.  Even so, the ratings that are provided in the latest Department of Defense semiannual report (November 2010) 

Shaping Transition: The Afghan National Police (ANP): Numbers that Disguise Major Problems in Quality, Ties to Power Brokers and Corruption

Once again, NTM-A provides data that shows the steady growth of the police force, and real progress in creating more effective training system. The manpower data do, however, lump together the different elements of the police force.  This data does -- like the data on the ANA – highlight some of the problems in retention.  It does do not, however, break out progress by element of the police, or spotlight the failure to expand the Afghan National Civil Order Police to anything like the needed goal. ISAF indicates that this critical paramilitary element of the police needs to be over four times its current strength, yet low retention rates and high attrition make rapidly expanding this force nearly impossible .

Far more realism is needed in measuring police force quality – particularly because corruption and ties to powerbrokers crippled the effectiveness of much of the police. Moreover, current rating systems do nothing to link the analysis of the police effort to the presence and effectiveness of the rest of the justice system and the presence of effective governance. The end result is that current effectiveness ratings  are virtually meaningless. If the police are to play a key role in  “hold, build, and transition” and free the Afghan Army to perform is military mission, much better assessments are needed.

The ANP also present more of a challenge than the ANA. ISAF initially tried to create a police force based on German models that were hopelessly underresourced and did not meet Afghan needs and values. This failure was followed by an equaled underresourced effort by the US State Department that largely ignored the fact that insurgent influence now required a police force that could deal with guerrilla warfare.  A third transfer of effort then occurred to the US Department of Defense, which began to set more realistic goals for paramilitary and self-defense capability, but was never properly resourced, and effectively increased the burden on the ISAF and US military training effort.

Worse, the police training and expansion effort has always been decoupled from a rule of law effort that has focused narrowly on creating a new formal justice system at the top.  This  allowed the Taliban and local power brokers to become the de facto system for local justices. Courts and jails were often lacking or unable to operate.

Moreover, the lack of effective local governance – an essential element in winning support for police and a justice system - meant that  an effective justice system was lacking much of the country.  This compounded the problem created by corruption, power brokers, and ethnic, sectarian, and tribal friction. All of these efforts were made worse by gross underpayment of salaries, corruption in hiring and promotion at every level, misuse of aid funds, and a lack of any effective effort to manage aid and development programs in the field.

Finally, new metrics and analysis will be needed to rate the creation and effectiveness of local police forces – where ties to power brokers and insurgents, given local factions, and the problem of extortion and the abuse of power potentially could be even worse than with the regular police.

Shaping Transition Looking Towards the Future of the ANSF

The best that can be said for the unclassified data that ISAF provides on its longer term plans for ANSF development and transition is that they are either so vague or non-existent that they cannot be said to be wrong, simply lacking in value and meaning.

The Need for Credibility, Integrity, and Transparency and Future Reports in this Series

Virtually every expert on the Afghan War could add new points to this list. It is also obvious from many of these points that the metrics shown in this report can only hint at a few key trends and problems. In far too many cases, there are no metrics and no reliable detailed histories – although the kind of metrics and analysis that should have existed is easy to derive from the summary of each problem.

At the same time, it is critical to stress that some parts of this series do show that progress is being made in addressing many of the issues involved, and that metrics are only part of that story. For all of the spin and omissions that still surround reporting on the war, progress has occurred over the last two years, and additional major efforts to correct these problems are underway.