Afghanistan and the Uncertain Metrics of Progress: Part Six: Showing Victory is Possible

The war in Afghanistan is now in its tenth year. In spite of that fact, the US, allied countries, ISAF, and the UN have failed to develop credible reporting on the progress of the war, to provide meaningful transparency on the problems and challenge it faces, and a to provide a meaningful plan for the future. Moreover, since June 2010, the unclassified reporting the US does provide has steadily shrunk in content – effectively “spinning” the road to victory by eliminating content that illustrates the full scale of the challenges ahead.

Drawing on Unclassified Official Reporting Lacking in Credibility and Transparency

The US is scarcely alone in failing to provide adequate reporting on the Afghan conflict. No allied government provides credible reporting on the progress of the war, and the Afghan government provides little detail of any kind. The UN, which has major responsibilities for aid, has failed to provide a meaningful overview of how aid requirements are generated, how aid efforts are managed and coordinated, of how funds are used, of the quality of fiscal controls and auditing, and of the effectiveness and impact of aid.

There are, however, some useful unclassified metrics in spite of the tendency to limit their content “spin” and “message control.” Moreover, some reflect real progress since the adoption of the new strategy for the war, and indicate a more frank, meaningful, and open reporting system would do a far more convincing job of winning support for the conflict – as well as be a way of obtaining the kind of feedback and informed criticism that could help meet the many problems and challenges that still shape the course of the fighting.

The Six Part Analysis of the War

The Burke Chair has prepared a six-part analytic overview of unclassified metrics, and of their current content relates to the challenges in policy, plans, resources, and management of the war that now reduce the prospects of victory. It should be stressed that such an analysis is only a way of flagging key trends and developments within the limits imposed by using unclassified official reporting.

Moreover, metrics are not a substitute for the kind of narrative that is critical to understand the complexity of this war, and put numbers, charts, and maps in context. This is a case where facing the real-world complexity of the conflict is essential to winning it.

Even an overview of the strengths and weakness of unclassified metrics does, however, provide considerable insight into what is known about the war, and the many areas where meaningful reporting is lacking and the reporting available is deceptive and misleading. The US, its allies, and ISAF may currently be repeating the same kind of overall messaging as the “follies” presented in Vietnam, but there are enough areas where facts still become public to put much of the war into perspective.

The first two reports in this series have already been circulated and are now available on the CSIS web site. They are entitled:

• Part One: The Failures that Shaped Today’s War  (Available on the CSIS web site at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110215_AfghanMetrics.pdf): This report highlights the US failure to resource the Afghan campaign, and the extent to which US failure to react to the growth of the Taliban, the al Qa’ida sanctuary in Pakistan, and the failures of the Afghan government turned near victory into near defeat.
• Part Two: Transitioning to the New Strategy  (Available on the CSIS web site at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110215_Afghan_Metrics_part_two.pdf): This briefing highlights graphics and tables that summarize the new strategy and campaign plan, the initial impact of the result build-up of US forces and changes in tactics and strategy on the intensity of the war, and early estimates of how the changes in strategy will impact on the US budget and the affordability of the war.
• Part Three: Key Ongoing Challenges (Available on the CSIS web site at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110228_Afghan_Metrics.pdf): This report highlights the unclassified graphics and tables that describe key individual challenges that affect the course of the fighting and the ability to implement the new strategy.
• Part Four: Hold and Build, and the Challenge of Development (Available on the CSIS web site at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110301_AfghanMetrics_part4.pdf): This report highlights the progress and challenges in what remains the weakest link in the US and allied effort in Afghanistan: Developing integrated civil-military operations, making effective use of aid, and making “hold, build, and transition” a functional reality.
• Part Five: Building Effective Afghan Forces: This report highlights the progress and challenges in creating the Afghan national security forces necessary to defeat the Taliban and other insurgents and allow a transition in which Afghanistan assumes responsibility for most military, internal security and police action.

Part Six:  Showing Victory is Possible

The Sixth report is now available. It is entitled Part Six: Showing Victory is Possible, and is available on the CSIS web site at https://csis.org/files/publication/110307_AfghanMetrics_part6.pdf): This report shows the metrics describing recent and current progress in implementing the new strategy.

Failing to Address Key Issues at a Time of Rising Costs and Critical Pressures on National Budgets

The US, allied states, and ISAF should provide an overview of how the strategy of “clear, hold, build, and transition” is working. In fact, recent unclassified analysis and metrics fails to do so in virtually every important respect. As has been shown in Parts Three, Four, and Five of this analysis, there is far too little transparency and credibility in dealing with major current challenges. The data in describing progress in governance, economics, and building capable Afghan forces far short of what should be available.

The limited unclassified data that are available on how the new strategy is working focus almost exclusively on current developments in the fighting, and many of these data have only been reported in very limited and large anecdotal form since mid-2010. The official data reported in the press consist largely of factoids more oriented towards “spin” than substance.

The end result is not to control the message, but to fail to provide one. It is hardly surprising that a great deal of media coverage is questioning or negative or that public opinion polls reflect a steady drop in support for the war. This is particularly critical a time that there is a budget crisis in virtually every country in ISAF and the cost of the war is rising so sharply.

Finding the Right Priorities within Credible Time and Resource Levels

ISAF and the US Department of Defense have issued metrics and analyses that describe the key military focus of the campaign, and – as is described in Part Two – have updated some of the key metrics showing the focus of the campaign.

There has been little supporting analysis, however, to tie such metrics and analyze to specific efforts to implement the strategic in the areas shown aside from military progress in Helmand and Kandahar, and that reporting has only had limited updating at the official level since June 2010. The data on the fighting also have not been support by meaningful data on related progress in governance, economics, aid, civil-military programs, justice systems, and all of the other critical elements in clear, hold, build, and transition.”

Moreover, none of these metrics and analysis cover Pakistan in meaningful form, and official reporting has failed to provide meaningful coverage on Afghan and Pakistani perceptions. This is a critical omission given the negative results of independent public opinion polls by NGOs. The failure to address such polling data raises series questions about the credibility and integrity of reporting on a strategy that is claimed to be population centric.

Centers of Gravity: Fighting in the South

There are some useful metrics and analyzes on the fighting in Helmand and progress in pushing the Taliban out of Kandahar. Once gain, however,  these data have not been updated in depth since June 2010.  Moreover, there has been an increasing emphasis on “spin,” and providing media with background briefings that emphasize tactical success without addressing the ability to provide the lasting security needed for “clear and hold;” or the governance, justice, and aid programs needed for “build and transition.”

Much of the combat reporting covers small populated or tactical areas without addressing trends by district, province, or the part of the population affected. On the one hand, it tends to cover carefully selected “ink spots” and on the other, generalize by district or province. It fails to address shifts in Taliban and insurgent presence and sanctuaries, continued presence and use of terrorism and intimidation, and shadow networks.  There is no clear examination between the role of the ANSF in such operations and the progress it is making, and media reports and data like the ANA and ANP effectiveness ratings shown in Part Five raise serious questions about how much progress is taking place. 

More broadly, the concentration of high quality armed forces like those of the US and Britain almost ensures local tactical victories, and some degree of local security and stability, as long as those forces are in place. However, the history of similar tactical victories in Vietnam, Iraq and earlier in Afghanistan have shown that such victories are meaningless without successful hold, build, and transition; and insurgents can reverse them when large US and allied forces leave.

Moreover, it is far from clear that ISAF, the US, and its allies pay sufficient attention to the many cases were insurgents appear to be defeated only to adapt and wait out opposing forces – exploiting civilian fears and fatigue, weaknesses in governance and the economy, and the limits to outside forces willingness and capability to sustain an unpopular conflict in what ultimately is a war of political attrition.

It is also far from clear how well the US and its allies can scale up and retain such victories with their current military force strength and the severe limits on civilian and civil-military aid.  ISAF and the US have never indicated how they will address these issues, and the issues affecting ANSF development raised in Part Five highlight   major challenges in getting the kind of Afghan capability necessary to substitute for ISAF forces, much less replace them.

Moreover, major improvements are needed in reporting on what happens once insurgents are driven out. “Victory” is relative as long as extremists and insurgents can keep up a consistent pattern of low level attacks. The reporting made available to date still focuses on major incidents.

A look on media reports of the chronology of violence in these areas shows a clear pattern of attacks on civilians designed to discredit the government, intimidate the people, and provoke local tensions. It is also critical to understand that ISAF and US metrics and analyses not include crime, kidnapping, extortion, perceived bias and failures by the Afghan security services, and perceptions of the overall effectiveness and fairness of the police and courts.  These are all critical indicators now that major fighting has halted. They measure the broad level of stability and security in Iraq, and the risk Iraqi and international investors and businesses run in the post-US forces era. 

Centers of Gravity: Kandahar

Kandahar is a work in progress where the ability to carry out an integrated civil-military campaign is critical, as is an early improvement in governance, services, prompt justice, and meeting key popular needs and grievances. There has been little reporting on what any aspect of such progress has been or is expected to be.

Centers of Gravity: The East

The same is true of fighting in the East.

Centers of Gravity: Rest of Afghanistan

There has been no detailed unclassified reporting on progress in halting and reversing the momentum of the Taliban and other insurgent groups in the full range of key districts and outside them.

The Role of Special Forces, Covert Operations, and Strikes by Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles

There are numerous press briefings that report major successes by Special Forces, in the use of UCAVs and other systems to attack leaders and networks, and in covert operations involving mixes of US and Afghan forces. NGOs and think tanks have also done useful reporting on some developments.

There are almost no official unclassified metrics and analyses, however, beyond summary, favorable statistics.  This is disturbing, given the long history of reports of successful attacks on insurgent groups that found new leaders, adapted, and rode out such attacks. Operational security is a critical issue, but the US and MNF-I did find ways to put such efforts in context in reporting on Iraq, and something more than the occasional body count is needed in reporting on how such operations affect the course of the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Pakistan: The Key Wild Card

To put it bluntly, no official reporting on progress in the war has credibility that does not include developments in Pakistan. Then political decision to omit such reporting in meaningful form – particularly given the negatives in public opinion polls on Pakistan and media and outside analytic reports – fundamentally undermines the credibility and integrity of current reporting on progress in the war.

The Need for Credibility, Integrity, and Transparency

Virtually every expert on the Afghan War could add new points to this list. It is also obvious from many of these points that the metrics shown in this report can only hint at a few key trends and problems. In far too many cases, there are no metrics and no reliable detailed histories – although the kind of metrics and analysis that should have existed is easy to derive from the summary of each problem.

At the same time, it is critical to stress that some parts of this series do show that progress is being made in addressing many of the issues involved, and that metrics are only part of that story. For all of the spin and omissions that still surround reporting on the war, progress has occurred over the last two years, and additional major efforts to correct these problems are underway.