Ahmadinejad in the Americas: Part 2

Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s trip to Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Ecuador got off to an uncertain start Sunday, with no word whether he would add a fifth stop in order to attend the inauguration of Guatemalan president-elect Otto Pérez Molina on January 14. Guatemala’s Foreign Ministry reportedly sent out invitations to some 140 countries, including Iran, with which it established ties in 1993.

Skepticism erupted in Guatemala’s congress, as deputies pointed out that their country had just begun its two-year stint on the UN Security Council, whose resolutions limit Iran’s nuclear ambitions. President-elect Pérez explained in a press conference, “If he [Ahmadinejad] happens to visit the country, it does not mean that Guatemala supports the policies of that nation.”

Q1: If Ahmadinejad’s welcome is not universal, what does he get out of the trip?

A1: A near decent opportunity to shore up solidarity. The current leaders of Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Ecuador have little but praise for the Iranian leader and share the Islamic Republic’s objective of offsetting the influence of the United States on the world stage. They will likely continue to offer a platform to criticize Western ideas of democracy and free markets, both in meetings and as a base for Iran’s hemispheric public diplomacy efforts. Of the leaders, Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez is key. In the past, he has helped Iran evade sanctions on banking and industries that support its military. Moreover, he has defended Iran’s nuclear program, which he claims is peaceful. Outwardly, Ahmadinejad and Chávez display confidence and strength. Chávez says he is surviving a health crisis and can still defy the United States. In private, Chávez could offer to help Iran sidestep the latest sanctions against its banks and oil exports.

Q2: What do Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Ecuador get from Ahmadinejad’s visit?

A2: The promise of more aid. Iran has supplied credit and loaned funds to Cuba to improve transportation infrastructure. It reportedly sent Iranian Guard instructors to oversee counterinsurgency training in Ecuador. In Nicaragua, Ahmadinejad has pledged money for a hospital, hydroelectric projects, and a dry canal between Pacific and Atlantic coasts. In Venezuela, it has gone much further, rehabilitating an old tractor plant, establishing a car factory, and constructing subsidized housing. In 2009, Chávez boasted that the two countries had been working together for years in mining and that henceforth they would establish a joint-venture mining company. Overall, there appear to be some 200 agreements and between $15 billion and $20 billion in joint ventures. Few know the real value of Iran’s investments in any of these countries, or how many are active, inactive, or nonexistent. Still, they may be worth enough for Iran to promise more in the future, in return for some favors now—especially after the United States and Europe imposed new sanctions.

Q3: What is the final word?

A3: On one level, Iran’s government is trying to compete with the United States in its own neighborhood. So are China, Russia, and the European Union in ways that make such efforts look small. On another level, Iran is building a network to support its military and nuclear agenda with a variety of countries, not just in the Western Hemisphere, but around the world. In the grand scheme of things, it is questionable whether the small alliance of Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas countries, dominated by Venezuela, has the capacity to do Iran much good.
Stephen Johnson is a senior fellow and director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and the author of Iran’s Influence in the Americas (CSIS, forthcoming).

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