The Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq

The attached analysis of the report of the Independent Commission on Iraqi Security Forces addresses the strengths and weakness of the report in detail, and places its findings in the broader political and strategic context of the pressures and tensions shaping events in Iraq.

Many key aspects of the report of the Independent Commission on Iraqi Security Forces, and its findings, track closely with my own experience in visiting Iraq, and in meeting independently with US and Iraqi officers, officials and experts. There are few areas where the report raises issues or problems in ISF development that I have not seen independently confirmed by my own visits to Iraq, discussions with Iraqi and US officers working on these issues, and other reports.

I also believe the Commission report is accurate in saying that ISF development can succeed in spite of these problems if the US is patient, willing to put in years of further effort, and realistic in  its  goals and efforts.

At the same time, accurate and useful as many of the Commission's findings are, the report fails to properly link its recommendations and analysis to problems created by the level of civil conflict in Iraq.  It also fails to properly address the importance of political accommodation as a precondition for the success of US effort.

There also are a range of other problems and issues that it does not fully address, and that the Congress and American people must address in deciding on the future of US intervention in Iraq.