The Iraqi Elections

The Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC) announced the preliminary result of the provincial elections in Iraq in 14 governorates, not including Dohuk, Erbil, Sulemaniayh, or “Kurdistan,” and not including a tense and deeply divided Kirkuk—the site of the northern oilfields. 

They are 90 percent preliminarily results and do not include the votes of the Iraqi Security Forces, displaced families, and contested votes being examined by the election commission in Anbar.

The results favor Maliki (Imposing Law slate) but are scattered and diverse. Maliki’s coalition got the largest vote in 9 out of the 14, but did not approach a majority in any province. His largest share was 38 percent in Baghdad and only 11 percent to 20 percent in others.

Maliki did clearly gain on Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), and nationalist and more secular parties did better in this election both nationally and among Shiite voters. ISCI had real problems and lost in many of the provinces it had controlled, including Najaf—Abdel Aziz al-Hakim’s home province. Fadhila lost badly in Basra, the one province it controlled and which is critical to oil exports and access to the Gulf. Sadr did get significant votes but scarcely got any kind of mandate in even a single province. These results are certain to lead to considerable Shiite on Shiite jockeying for power.

The results expose equal divisions within Arab Sunni movements, with new tribal parties emerging as the potential victor amidst charges of Islamic Party corruption in Anbar.
The key Arab–Kurd minority issue was obscured by not holding elections in Anbar. The results did, however, exposed major fractures line in Mosul and Diyala. Arab-Kurdish struggles in Salah al-Din and Ninewa will emerge more at the local level.

Reports that the results would favor nationalist parties were partly validated, but the success of the National List and similar parties varied sharply by province.

Looking at the results, they are generally reassuring. They show de facto rejection of proposals for a nine- or three-province Shiite federation, parties with close ties to Iran, and sectarianism versus nationalism.

However, there are many local areas where these results may lead to violence or divisive power struggles. These elections did not resolve any of the political uncertainties and potential sources of violence that Iraq must face in the coming year. They also lay the groundwork for practical struggles to see who controls positions, money, the police, and influence in virtually every province where a vote occurred.

The outcome will bring meaningful local representation to Iraq for the first time and may help put it on a more pragmatic political path. It is clear, however, that they are only the prelude to a year-long struggle going into the national elections and that there is only so long that the Arab-Kurdish issue can be kept on hold.

Many of those elected also have little or no real political experience or experience with governance. This is not a casual problem. Iraqi has dropped from a nation with an unspent budget surplus to a nation caught up in the global financial crisis and which will not get further major donations of foreign aid. Unemployment, poor government services, and infrastructure problems remain critical. The Iraqi government is the source of virtually all surplus income and is the direct or direct employer of roughly 70 percent of the jobs outside the agricultural sector. Iraqis have already shown they want strong leadership and care more about the quality of governance than the way that their government is chosen.

Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.