North Korean Provocations

Q1: What is North Korea up to?

A1: On February 3, the South Korean and Japanese media reported indications that North Korea could be preparing to test a long-range missile. The stories referred to satellite imagery revealing a train carrying an object believed to be the Taepodong-2 missile (which technically could reach North America) and noted that the preparation process could take up to two months. Pyongyang conducted an unsuccessful test of the same missile in July 2006 during an impasse in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear programs. The North Korean test of the Taepodong-1 missile in August 1998 caused a major crisis in Northeast Asia.

Q2: What could be motivating the North Korean regime?

A2: Analysts cite several factors that could explain such a development. The first is Pyongyang’s frustration with the administration of South Korean president Lee Myung-Bak, who has taken a tougher stance toward the North in contrast to his predecessors Roh Moo-Hyun and Kim Dae-Jung. Pyongyang recently announced that it would withdraw from all nonaggression pacts with Seoul and has used increasingly belligerent rhetoric when referring to Lee. The regime also has greeted the Obama administration with invective and may be testing the new U.S. president or raising the ante with respect to negotiations over the North’s nuclear weapons programs—as it did with the July 2006 missile test and the October 2006 explosion of a nuclear device. The Six-Party Talks are currently stalled because of the North’s refusal to accede to a verification protocol for denuclearization. A third possibility relates to the reports of the declining health and power of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il, though from two different angles. Kim reportedly suffered a stroke last summer and reappeared only last month in a meeting with a senior Chinese official. Kim might use a missile test to signify his control; alternatively, a missile test could imply the ascent of the military during a power vacuum. Finally, there is a consistent pattern of North Korea using lulls in the diplomacy to create crises that in turn afford opportunities to continue testing and perfecting its missile and nuclear inventory—moving the North closer to its goal of marrying nuclear weapons to a long-range missile capable of striking the United States (that capability is still a ways off).

Q3: Is this just bluster?

A3: Heated rhetoric from North Korea is somewhat predictable, but bombast followed by a missile test or other provocation would reflect a well-established pattern of escalating tension in pursuit of a specific objective, whether increased food aid, bilateral dialogue with the United States, or more conciliatory policies from its neighbors.

Q4: What are the next steps for the United States?

A4: A delegation of U.S. experts led by former ambassador to South Korea Stephen Bosworth is visiting Pyongyang this week, though not at the behest of the Obama administration. That visit could shed light on North Korean motivations. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who has stated that the Obama administration would be open to direct dialogue with North Korea, is reportedly heading to Asia next week for consultations in Tokyo, Seoul, and Beijing—an opportune time to address the future of the Six-Party Talks and forge a consensus on the proper combination of dialogue and pressure that is critical to dealing with Pyongyang. Should a missile test occur, disparate responses from the United States and the other parties would only embolden Kim’s regime.

Nicholas Szechenyi is deputy director and fellow with the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2009 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.