TWQ: The Missing Endgame for Afghanistan: A Sustainable Post-Bin Laden Strategy - Fall 2011

Within hours of President Obama’s announcement of Osama bin Laden’s May 2 death, pundits and politicians from both the right and left were calling for a speedier withdrawal from Afghanistan. The discovery and targeted killing of bin Laden in a compound on the outskirts of Abbottabad,
Pakistan, located less than a mile from the Pakistan Military Academy, dramatically amplified concerns about elements of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence service (ISI) maintaining links with
al-Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations. Many argued that the death of al-Qaeda’s leader meant that our post-9/11 mission had been accomplished, and our expensive presence in Afghanistan was no longer needed amidst an era of mounting debt and budget fights.

Many others responded after bin Laden’s death that withdrawing troops would risk reversing the gains that have been made by a nearly 10-year military effort and could cause Afghanistan to reemerge as a
destabilizing pariah that violates human rights and supports terrorist groups which threaten international security. Prior to the recent covert operation heard around the world, there had been multiple independent reports indicating that the arrival of thousands of “surge” forces had resulted in substantial tactical gains for ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces in the former Taliban heartland of southern Afghanistan. A hastened withdrawal could recreate the anarchy that followed the 1989 Soviet withdrawal and subsequent U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan.

That anarchy enabled the rise of the Taliban, which severely destabilized Afghanistan’s neighbors and served as a critical enabler for a wide variety of terrorist groups which carried out attacks against
 the United States, Europe, India, Pakistan, and Central Asia. Conversely, a stable Afghanistan that sits on the crossroads between Central, South, and East Asia would help bring stability and prosperity
to Eurasia, while simultaneously enhancing the credibility of the members of ISAF and dealing a major blow to regional extremist movements.

Yet, although an immediate or accelerated withdrawal would be tremendously illadvised, our current military-centric strategy in Afghanistan is also unsustainable and suffers from a debilitating
credibility deficit. A complementary long-term, coordinated regional economic and entrepreneurial development program is needed to help consolidate our current military gains and foster sustainable Afghan and regional stability over the long term. Our security-focused strategy needs to place a greater emphasis on appropriately addressing regional dynamics and promoting sustainable economic development, which helps to unify the region in the interest of shared stability and prosperity. Such a development would help establish a politically neutral Afghanistan and decrease regional tensions.