Violence in Iraq: The Growing Risk of Serious Civil Conflict

The rising level of violence in Iraq is difficult to measure and interpret, but it presents a serious risk that Iraq could return to the level of civil conflict it experience during the mid-2000s.
The revised and updated version of a recent analysis by the Burke Chair at CSIS examines the patterns and trends in Iraqi violence since the departure of US forces at the end of 2011. It examines the statistics on violence and their limits. It also examines the relative role of the Iraqi central government as a cause of such violence relative to the role and nature of violent non –state actors and extremist groups.

The study is entitled Violence in Iraq in 2013: The Growing Risk of Serious Civil Conflict, and it is available on the CSIS web site at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130909_Violence_in_Iraq_Growing_Risks.pdf

The study finds that there are many serious problems in estimating Iraq’s level of violence, its causes and the responsibility of given actors. Data from, UNAMI, declassified US intelligence sources and other US reporting, and NGOS like Iraq Body Count are, however, good enough develop detailed trend charts and maps, and to warn that Iraq may be moving back to a level of civil conflict that will amount to a serious civil war.

The also, however, examines the full range of challenges that still push Iraq towards civil conflict as well as the impact of Iraq’s power struggles.  It discusses the role of both key Iraqi political developments and key-non state actors, and ties the patterns in violence to Iraq’s politics, leaders, and security forces as well as to individual extremist and terrorist groups.

The data also reflect the fact that violence is not simply the produce of extremists and terrorist groups, Iraq’s growing violence is a product of the fact that Iraq is the scene of is in an ongoing struggle to establish a new national identity: one that can bridge across the deep sectarian divisions between its Shi’ites and Sunnis as well as the ethnic divisions between its Arabs and its Kurds and other minorities.

Iraq does have great potential and its political divisions and ongoing low-level violence do not mean it cannot succeed in establishing stability, security, and a better life for its people. Iraq cannot succeed, however, by denying the problems it faces, the growing level of violence and the responsibility of Iraq’s current political leaders for its problems.

Improving the quality and focus of Iraqi efforts at counterterrorism and internal security is a key priority, but Iraq cannot end its violence through force or repression. Iraq’s leaders must build a new structure of political consensus. They must build an effective structure of governance, and social order that sharply reduces the problems caused by the mix of dictatorship, war, sanctions, occupation, and civil conflict that began in the 1970s and has continued ever since.

Iraq must also deal with deep underlying problems. It must cope with a steadily growing population, and diversify an economy that is so dependent on petroleum exports that they provide some 95% of its government revenues. This struggle can still end in a new round of serious civil conflict and even in the division of the country.

Table of Contents and Figures:

THE CHALLENGES THAT SHAPE IRAQ’ VIOLENCE    5
Figure One: US Census Bureau Estimate of the Growing Demographic Pressures on Iraq    11

IRAQ’S CONTINUING LEVELS OF INTERNAL VIOLENCE    13
The Underlying Patterns of Violence    13
The Problems in Analyzing Iraqi Violence    13
Reassurance vs. Rising Violence    14
Measuring Trends Rather than Absolute Numbers    15
The Rise in Violence in 2012-2013: How Much is Too Much?    16
Casualty Estimates through 2012    23
Figure Two: Iraqi Ministries (Color) vs. Iraq Body Count (Gray) Estimate of Trends in Casualites: 1 Jan 2011-30 December 2012    25
Figure Three: Iraqi Body Count Estimate of Trends in Casualites: 2003-2013    26
Figure Four: Recent Trends in Casualites: “The Country Remains in a State of Low-Level war Little Changed Since Early 2009”    27
Figure Five:  NCTC data on Violence in Iraq – Part One:    28
Total Victims (Killed , Injured, Kidnapped) In Iraq and recent Trends in Civilian Victims, 2005-2011    28
Figure Six: Bombings and Shootings Remained the Key Killing Mechanisms through 2012    29
Figure Seven: Consistent Trend Data Do Not Exist, But the Army and Police Remain Key Targets    30
Figure Eight: The Impact of Internal Conflict on Smaller Minority Groups 2003-2011    31
Figure Nine: Arrests on Terrorism Charges (1/14/2012-4/10/2012)    33
Figure Ten: Selected Acts of Apparent Targeted Violence, 1/11/2012–4/10/2012    34
Figure Eleven: SIGIR Estimates of Patterns of Violence By Quarter – Part One    35
Figure Eleven: SIGIR Estimates of Patterns of Violence By Quarter – Part Two    36
Figure Twelve: AKE Estimates of Patterns of Violence By Quarter – Part One    37
Incidents During January 2012    37
Figure Twelve: AKE Estimates of Patterns of Violence By Quarter – Part Two    38
: Incidents During February 2012    38
Figure Twelve: AKE Estimates of Patterns of Violence By Quarter – Part Three Incidents During March 2012    39
Figure Twelve: AKE Estimates of Patterns of Violence By Quarter – Part Four    40
: Incidents During April 2012    40
Figure Twelve: AKE Estimates of Patterns of Violence By Quarter – Part Five:    41
Incidents During May 2012    41
Figure Thirteen: Iraqi Body County Estimates of Patterns of Violence By Province in 2012    42
The 2013 Surge in Violence    43
Rising Numbers of Dead and Wounded    43
Refugees: The Other Casualties    46
The Uncertain Intensity of the Civil war    47
Figure Fourteen: The US State Department Estimates that Iraq Ranks Second Among the Top Ten Centers of Terrorist Activity in 2012    48
Figure Fifteen: Iraqi Body Count Estimate of Trends in Casualites: 2010-2013    49
Figure Sixteen: Iraqi Body Count Reporting on Major Acts of Violence in August and Early September 2013    50
Figure Seventeen: UNAMI Estimate of Iraqi Killed and Injured  November 2012-July 2013 – Part One    53
Figure Seventeen: UNAMI Estimate of Iraqi Killed and Injured  November 2012-July 2013 – Part Two    54

STATE ABUSES OF POWER VERSUS THE CONTINUING ROLE OF VIOLENT EXTREMIST GROUPS    55
Iraqi Politics and the Iraqi Government as a Cause of Violence    56
The Threat of Extremist Non-State Actors    59
SIGIR reports    60
US State Department Annual Report on Terrorism, and the Annual calendar of the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).    61
Figure Twenty-Five: US Official State Department and NCTC reports on Terrorist Threats and State Sponsors of Terrorism in or Near Iraq:    64
AL-QA’IDA IN IRAQ    64
SYRIA    66
ABDALLAH AZZAM BRIGADES    66
ANSAR AL-ISLAM    67
IRAN    68
KATA’IB HIZBALLAH    69
KURDISTAN WORKERS’ PARTY    70
KONGRA-GEL (KGK) - formerly the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, PKK    70
Syrian Spillover & al Qa’ida’s Iraqi-Syrian Merger    72
The Inactive Non-State Actor: Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)    72
Polls Show Growing Popular Fears and Dissatisfaction    74
Figure Twenty-Six: Percentages of Iraqis Who Say They Are “Suffering” or “Thriving”    76

PROTESTS, POPULAR DISSATISFACTION, AND THE ROLE OF POLITICS    77

Other recent studies deal with the trend in Iraq include Changing U.S. Strategy: The Search for Stability and the “Non-War” Against “Non-Terrorism,” available on the CIS web site at, http://csis.org/publication/search-stability-and-non-war-against-non-terrorism

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Anthony H. Cordesman

Anthony H. Cordesman

Former Emeritus Chair in Strategy