There is no easy way to provide an overview of all of the risks and issues that will shape the stability of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in 2016. Much of the news reporting and analysis of the Middle East seems to lurch from one crisis to another on the basis of whatever crisis has the most visibility on a given day. Sometimes the focus is on Yemen, other times it is on ISIS, Assad, or terrorism outside the region. Most recently, it is the fact that the long standing tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran has escalated yet again.

As long as each crisis is seen individually, and in the context of the current headlines, one crisis may seem to dominate events on a given day. Moreover, once a crisis is taken out of its historical context and decoupled from the overall pattern of events, it somehow seems new and dramatic – rather than part of a much broader pattern, one that often has taken decades to emerge, and the trends and risks in a region where one set of tensions and conflicts cannot be separated from another.

In reality, the Middle East, North Africa, and much of the Islamic world are caught up in an interlocking pattern of crises that began decades ago and has become steadily more serious over time, and that now seems almost certain to play out over at least the next decade. Tomorrow’s crisis and headlines – like today’s – will focus on a snapshot of one element of this pattern.

However, it will be the overall pattern of events, and not the event of the day, that will dominate the region in 2016 and in the future. Even if one only looks at the immediate problems and risks affecting 2016.

Figure One shows how complex the mix of issues, threats, and potential problems really is – although it should be stressed that listing risks does not mean that given risks will be critical or more serious in 2016. Moreover the overall pattern of events will be driven by both mix of broad and enduring challenges in governance, demographics, economics, religion, and social change summarized in Figure Two.

A new analysis by the Burke Chair provides a summary overview of all of these issues, and how they will affect key aspect of political, military, economic, and investment risk in 2016. It also examines key trends in the regions ongoing wars, and centers of extremism and terrorism, and how these will interact with the massive humanitarian crisis that has already developed and the potential crisis caused a by massive cut in oil revenues.

This analysis is entitled Risks and Instability in the Middle East and North Africa in 2016 and is available on the CSIS web site at http://csis.org/files/publication/160114_cordesman_risks_and_instability.pdf.

The table of contents includes:

Introduction

Figure One: The Interlocking Crisis and Conflicts Shaping the Middle East ands North Africa in 2016

Broader and Enduring Challenges to Stability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA): 1965-2050

Figure Two: The Enduring Forces shaping Instability and Conflict in the MENA Region

Figure Three: Government Effectiveness and Failed Secularism

Figure Four: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Ranking (Out of 177)

Figure Five: Population Pressures on MENA States

Demographic Pressure: 1950-2050 (In Millions)

Figure Six: Youth Bulge ((Percentage of Native Population Below 25)

The Heritage of War and Violence through 2015

Key Challenges in 2016

The Broader Crisis with Iran in Military Forces, the Gulf, and the Region

Figure Seven The Sunni, Shi’ite, and Other Sectarian Divide

Tensions with Iran and the Iranian Elections

A Broader Arab Focus on Assad, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen and the Failure of Peace Initiatives in Syria and Yemen

Grindingly Slow Progress Against ISIS and Al Qaeda

Figure Eight: Fighting and Factions in Syria and Iraq

Figure Ninet: Washington Post Map of ISIS Affiliates

Figure Ten: Spread of Attacks And Groups Affiliated to ISIS/ISIL as of 12/2015

Turkey and the “Kurdish Problem”

Figure Eleven: The Kurdish Issue

Yemen and the Red Sea

Egypt, the Sinai, Gaza, and the 3rd Intifada

Libya and Tunisia

Russia

The United States

The Broader Challenge of Extremism and Terrorism

Figure Twelve: The Broader Patterns in Terrorism

The Worsening Humanitarian Crisis

Figure Thirteen: Immediate Humanitarian Impact of Conflict and Crisis in the Middle East, North Africa, and Nearby Regions

The Economic and Petroleum Wild Cards in 2016

Figure Fourteen: The Crisis in Oil Prices

Figure Fifteen: A Guesstimate of the Decline in Oil Revenues in Nations with Government 60-90% Dependent on Petroleum Related Revenues

Figure One: The Interlocking Crisis and Conflicts Shaping the Middle East ands North Africa in 2016

1. The Cumulative regional impact of Iran-Iraq War, U.S. invasion of Iraq, Arab “winter” in 2011, Saudi/GCC-Iranian tension, religious tension and extremism, instability in Yemen, poor governance and development

2. The Morocco-Algeria-Polisario conflict over Western Sahara and access to Atlantic.

3. The Moroccan emigration crisis, problems in economic development, youth bulge and employment issues.

4. Algerian stability through repression and military dominated rule linked to major population problems, jobs and housing issues, corruption, and issues with extremists and terrorists coupled to massive cuts in oil and gas revenues.

5. Interaction between migration, narcotics, human trafficking, ethnic tensions, Islamic extremism and terrorism across the Sahara and impact in Europe.

6. Civil war in Libya with separate “East” and “west” governments coupled to presence of ISIS, tribal conflicts, Arab-Berber issues, post-Qaddafi economic crisis and low oil prices.

7. Uncertain Tunisian stability and ongoing elements of terrorism; poor economic stability.

8. Egyptian struggle for stability, low level conflict in Sinai, repression vs. Islamic extremism, economic crisis, role in Gaza, Libya, and Arab alliance. Questions about future outside aid levels because of oil revenue crisis. Major employment, career, tourism, and economic development issues.

9. Escalating Israeli-Palestinian “3rd Intifada” focused on conflict rather than two state solution linked to outside extremism, conflicts in Sinai and Syria, power struggles between hardline movements in Gaza, and steadily increase missile and rocket forces in Lebanon.

10. Uncertain “stability of post-civil war stability in Lebanon, critical refugee problems, threat from extremist pressure on border, Hezbollah armament and role in Syria plus ties to Iran. Questions about future aid levels. Lack of broadly based economic development, mixed impact of population growth and emigration on sectarian balance.

11. Conflict between Assad regime and divided Sunni Arab rebels in Syria. Uncertain role of Al Nusra Front and other rebels linked to Al Qaida. Emergence of Syrian Kurds as new force. Conflict with Syrian part of ISIS, role of Iran and Hezbollah. Tensions over Turkish role, massive refugee and IDP crisis impact on more than half the population, Impact of U.S. and other Arab states. Impact of Russia. Economy dropping below 1/3 of 2011 level. Massive military damage to housing, businesses, infrastructure. Lack of recovery and development plans and options.

12. Conflict between ISIS and Iraqi government, U.S. led coalition, Iran, and Hezbollah. Serious Arab-Kurd and Sunni-Shi’ite tensions. Deeply divided and weak Iraq central government. Intra Shi’ite power struggles and tensions. Similar lack of unity in Kurds and Sunnis. Uncertain effort to build effective Iraq ground forces. Threat posed by Shi’ite militias. Serious tensions with Turkey. Impact of Russia. Lack of military stability operations and effective recovery efforts to date, failed development and new economic crisis over oil prices.

13. Iranian tensions with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states. Role in transfer of arms to Hezbollah and Gaza, and role in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Support of Shi’ite hardline or violent elements in Bahrain, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, etc. Uncertain impact of nuclear agreement with P5+1 (JCPOA), and uncertain use of post-sanctions revenues. Steadily increasing missile forces, growing naval-air-missile capability to threaten or close the Gulf, continuing threats to Israel. Arms race with GCC and other Arab states, and uncertain impact of Russia in transferring modern weapons like S-400. Uncertain balance of moderate and hardline forces in leadership. Two key elections. Serious water issues, employment issues, and agricultural crisis. Uncertain economic development plans and new economic crisis over oil prices.

14. Jordan caught up in Syrian and Iraq wars with ISIS, concern over Iranian expansion, links to Saudi Arabia and GCC. Major problems in dealing with Syrian and Iraqi refugees. Economic development issues. Spillover in investment and job creation from economic problems in neighboring states and oil revenue crisis. Impact of “3rd Intifada” in Israel. Internal divisions between rural and urban areas, and tribal issues.

15. Saudi Arabian tensions with Iran, role in Yemen War, challenge from Islamist extremists and terrorist movements. Internal problems with Shi’ites. Role in supporting regime in Bahrain. Key force modernization issues and problems in defining partnership with the U.S.: naval modernization, missile defense, security of Gulf and maritime transit, improvement of counterterrorism forces. Possible problems with increasingly hardline anti-terrorism operations. Uncertain nature of Arab Coalitions and ongoing problems in creating interoperable and integrated forces in GCC. Uncertain future role in Syria and Iraq. Serious economic and stability challenges from crisis in petroleum export revenues potentially affecting housing, job creation, diversification, medical, and infrastructure plans.

16. UAE’s similar problems with Iran, role in Yemen War, approach to Syrian civil war and Syrian-Iraqi conflict with ISIS. Possible problems with increasingly hardline anti-terrorism operations. Key force modernization issues and problems in defining partnership with the U.S.: naval modernization, missile defense, security of Gulf and maritime transit, improvement of counterterrorism forces. Uncertain impact of cuts in petroleum revenues, and lifting sanctions on Iran.

17. Qatar’s similar problems with Iran, approach to Syrian civil war and Syrian-Iraqi conflict with ISIS. Residual tensions with neighbors.

18. Divided and ineffective Kuwaiti government with growing internal tensions, including Sunni vs. Shi’ite problems linked to Iran. Uncertain role on Kuwait in regional security, and political divisions that limit petroleum and other aspects of economic development.

19. Oman’s semi-isolation in GCC, role in Yemen, and tensions with Iran. Sultan’s age and illness. Lack of transparency on internal security issues. Uncertain economic progress in terms of Omanization, job creation, and agricultural reform. Impact of cuts in petroleum revenues.

20. Impact of combination of civil war, and Houthi/Saleh war with Saudi led Coalition. U.S. role in supporting air operations. Uncertain role of Iran. Lack of any clear outcome that can bring stability. Fact wars have impacted on what was already a failed state in terms of human development, economic problems and job creation, narcotics consumption, limited petroleum revenue, north-south and tribal divisions, governance, population pressure, agriculture and water. Pressure to migrate to Saudi Arab, GCC states, and beyond.

21. Uncertain role of Turkey and Erdogan government on growing Kurdish “issues” in Syria and Iraq. Resumption of Turkish civil conflict in PKK,. uncertain role of Turkey in conflict against ISIS and political-ethnic-sectarian tensions in Syria and Iraq. Tensions with U.S. over Kurds and level of opposition to ISIS.

22. Broad regional concern over perceived lack of U.S. leadership, strategy, role as military partner, and ties to Iran that will be heighten by partisan and sometimes extreme U.S. Presidential campaign.

23. U.S. and Russian tensions over Russia’s role in Syria, arms sales, and broader role in region. Russian charges that U.S. is creating instability and over color revolutions. Impact on European security and Ukraine.

24. Lack of any coherent European policy to any issue in the region.

25. Critical impact of Chinese economic growth and European recovery on regional economy and petroleum revenues.

26. Rising tensions and problems over European and U.S. treatment of refugees, Muslim population, counterterrorism. Serious risk of growing religious tension between West and Islamic world.

Figure Two: The Enduring Forces shaping Instability and Conflict in the MENA Region

1. Cumulative impact of massive population growth, hyperurbanization, lack of agricultural modernization and reform, and economic diversification.

2. Extremely young population, “youth bulge” creating job and career crisis, lack of housing, education, and services, inability to marry and support a family

3. Poor governance, security based on authoritarianism, acute corruption, crony capitalism, and steadily deteriorating equity in income distribution.

4. Security based on authoritarianism and repression rather than dealing with causes of extremism and conflict.

5. Acute ethnic, sectarian. Tribal, and other sources of internal tensions and conflict.

6. Lack of effective and credible economic development efforts .

7. Wasted years since 2011 with major losses of housing, jobs, businesses, education.

8. Ongoing struggle for the future of Islam involving both extremism and Sunni vs. Shi’ite and other Islamic minorities that will endure regardless of what happens to ISIS and Al Qaida.

9. Focus on short term and local tactical victories in actual conflicts with lack of adequate recovery and development efforts. Military are all “win,” with little real world “hold” or “build” capability.

10. Lack of credible options and management and implementation capability for recovery, time involved, and cost.

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Anthony H. Cordesman

Anthony H. Cordesman

Former Emeritus Chair in Strategy