Shaping the ANSF to meet the Challenges of Transition

The Burke Chair at CSIS has developed a new analysis of the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the challenges they face, entitled Shaping the Uncertain Future of Afghan National Security Forces. It is available on the CSIS web site here.

It should be stressed that creating an effective Transition for the ANSF is only one of the major challenges that Afghanistan, the US, and Afghanistan’s other allies face during 2014-2015 and beyond. The five other key challenges include:

• Going from an election to effective leadership and political unity.
• Creating an effective and popular structure of governance, with suitable reforms from the local to central government, reducing corruption to acceptable levels, and making suitable progress in planning, budgeting, and budget execution.
• Coping with the upcoming major cuts in outside aid and military spending in Afghanistan, adapting to a largely self-financed economy, developing renewal world economic development plans, carrying out the reforms pledged at the Tokyo Conference, and reducing the many barriers to doing business.
• Establishing relations with Pakistan and other neighbors that will limit outside pressures and threats, and reduce insurgent sanctuaries on Afghanistan’s border.
• Persuading the US, other donors, NGCO, and nations will to provide advisors to furnish the needed aid effort through at least 2018, and probably well beyond.

The full range of such challenges is summarized in Pages 4-6 of this briefing, and addressed in detail in another Burke Chair briefing, The Challenges to Transition in Afghanistan: 2014-2015, which is available on the CSIS web site here.

Nevertheless, Afghanistan cannot succeed unless the ANSF meets the wide range of security challenges summarized in Page 7, and which are the subject of this briefing. Many of these challenges are ones that all governments face in shaping an effective security response to major extremist and insurgent threats. Others are unique to Afghanistan.

It should be clear from this list of key challenges and the remainder of the briefing that the ANSF faces problems that make a successful Transition a high risk effort even if the ANSF is the only factor considered in supporting an effective Transition. This risk is highlighted in much of the data that follow, and in virtually all of the narratives describing the current state of the ANSF.

At the same time, the briefing shows that there are positive as well as negative trends. The ANSF may be able to succeed if it receive suitable outside support, and particularly if it has a substantial advisory and enable presence from the US, if other key ISAF states like Germany and Italy provide a presence in in key areas, and if the donors provide the funds necessary for the ANSF to develop, operate, and mature.

The Challenge of Money and Corruption

Afghanistan faces major problems in avoiding a major recession and economic crisis in the course of Transition. In spite of optimistic and sometimes grossly exaggerated claims made by some Afghan officials and outside NGOs donors, Afghanistan has not made serious progress towards economic development. Moreover, Afghanistan’s market economy is dependent on military spending and outside flow of aid, it cannot finance its budget, and it has no near to mid-term prospects of major increases in revenues through panaceas like mining and the “New Silk Road.”

Page 12 shows that its overall economic growth and critical agricultural sector have been shaped more by an irregular level of annual rainfall in recent years than by any pattern of aid or market-driven economic growth. Page 14 warns that its critical market-oriented service sector could be crippled by the cuts in military spending and aid that have sustained its growth since the early 2000s.

Pages 15-18 show the Afghan government already faces major problems in funding its entire budget, not just the ANSF.

The critical Service sector of its economy faces massive problems in adjusting to cuts in outside spending. According to an article in the Washington Post, its government revenues fall far short of previous expectations and its budget needs, and are projected to fall some $400 million short of the $2.5 billion-plus in total government spending projected for 2014, and the some $7 billion in total spending projection for 2015 and the initial years of Transition. Customs revenues alone fell $105 million short of the $540 million projected for December 2013 through March 2014. (Kevin Sieff & Joshua Partlow, “Afghan Economy Faces Serious Shortfall,” Washington Post, April, 16, 2014. p. A8.)

Worse, Page 19 shows that international organizations like the World Bank, NGOs like Transparency International, and US government organization like SIGARs and the US Department of Defense 1230 report have found many past military and civil aid efforts to have had little or no overall impact, involve massive waste and corruption, and reflect a serious inability to plan and execute both effective security and civil budgets.

At the same time, Pages 20-23 show that aid spending – most of which went to the ANSF, has been erratic, poorly managed, lacks basic fiscal controls, involved high levels of dependence on contractors which have sometime been corrupt, and lacks meaningful measures of effectiveness. This is particularly true of the US which has never developed meaningful effectiveness measures for either civil or security aid, had no clear budget plans for funding aid in the future, and where the US congress cut a $2.1 billion aid request for financial assistance nearly in half for this year.

Afghanistan desperately needs to reduce corruption, create a more effective systems for planning, managing, and executing its budget, and real world economic and aid plans focused on its overall needs and real priorities.

Donors need to understand, however, that Afghanistan will remain grossly corrupt, inefficient, and lacking in keys of competence through at least 2016. THE REALITY IS THAT IT WILL TAKE MONEY TO COMPENSATE DURING THE MOST CRITICAL YEARS OF TRANSITION.

This is particularly true of the security sector. Afghanistan cannot manage to both fight an ongoing war and continue to develop its capabilities unless donors accept the reality that its efforts will not be efficient and that power brokering and corruption will continue at some level indefinitely into the future. They must be prepare for this reality and accept the fact that money will be the real world answer to m any of the problems in Afghan security and the ANSF in the near term. A fantasy based on unrealistic standards will defeat the Afghan government more effectively than the Taliban.

Warfighting Challenges

Afghanistan is still very much a nation at war, and the Taliban and other insurgents have not been defeated.

Pages 28-31 show that ISAF has not provided any convincing metrics to suggest that the surge in Afghanistan was as successful as the one in Iraq, and ISAF has virtually stopped reporting on the progress of the war.

ISAF and the US government also have has never provided maps or other useful metrics that show areas of Taliban political control or influence,  or matching maps of the areas and district where the government lacks effective governance and security activity. They focused on tactical encounters and never publically addressed the political-military realities of an insurgency and COIN campaign.

Pages 32-33 show that the plans for Transition have been phased in order to reduce the strain on the ANSF, but every meaningful source – including NATO/ISAF – agree that the ANSF will face a major warfighting challenge during Transition, that the Afghan government major lose control of territory in the process, and that it could face serious defeats without major outside aid through at least 2016 and probably well beyond.

Challenges in Shifting from ISAF to the ANSF

The  development of the ANSF has been rushed forward to meet an end of 2014 deadline for removing outside combat forces with less and less consideration of the actual progress in the ANSF and “conditions based” criteria shaped by the outcome of the fighting and the potential post-transition strength of the Taliban and other insurgents.
ISAF and the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) have repeatedly made it clear that the transfer of responsibility for security is a formal one, and that the ANSF will need substantial outside assistance through at least 2016. The key challenges involved are summarized in Page 37.

The development of the ANSF presents much broader problems, however, and Pages 38 and 39 show that more than 40% half of the force consists of police with little real paramilitary experience, much less intense warfighting capability. There have also been discussions of major cuts in the force – down to levels approaching 250,000 men for fiscal reasons – before the ANSF had had to deal with the insurgent threat on its own for even one campaign season.

Moreover, even the Army is relatively lightly equipped and its real world mobility and maneuver capability away from fixed based and support facilities is limited. (Page 39.)

There has been real progress in shifting the burden of the fighting to the ANSF, and this is shown in Pages 40-43. The ANSF’s growing casualties, however, are not a measure of military merit. (Page 41).

The data on the ANA and ANP led operations also do not explain what kind of operations are involved, or indicate that most forces are aggressive, actively patrol, and can conduct serious offensives against insurgents. (Page 44.) 

There are some polling data that show Afghan forces are winning increase support and confidence from the Afghan people. (Page 45.)

Transition Without An Approved Plan

The ANSF has no approved Transition plan and the US has not made any public decisions about the level of future manning and support that it will provide. The US has generated countless possible options from a “zero option” to some 13,500 military and other personnel, but has never described their cost, a clear aid plan, what the personnel would do, and what future role it would play in COIN or enabling.

The President and NSC have failed to provide any meaningful leadership and the Afghan government is incapable of such planning and cannot execute a plan without knowing the level of aid it will receive. No one follows where no one leads. And so little time is left that the situation is reaching the crisis point, and the failure of clear US leadership may ultimately prove to be as much of a threat to Afghan stability as the insurgency.

ISAF has, however, developed a concept of layered defense that would tie together all of the elements of the ANSF to protect key populated areas and key lines of communication (LOCs).  The basic data involved are uncertain, but are shown in broad terms in Pages 48 to 52, along with the ISAF commander’s assessment of the key challenges involved, and the minimal level of advisory support that would be needed.

There are maps that provide a rough illustration of the nature and scale of the challenges involved. These maps are shown in Pages 52 to 59.

Nominal annual costs for the entire ANSF have been provided in the past by ISAF, NTM-A and other sources that range from $3.6 billion to $4.1 billion to over $7 billion, but there is no public evidence of serious planning or cost analysis to justify any figure, no detailed ISAF or NTM-A plan, no ANSF plan, and no US military aid plan

There is no public indication of how forces would be layered and deployed for such operations, or of the areas the ANSF might have to give up to execute such a plan.

The Challenge of the Afghan National Army (ANA)

The ANA is still shifting from the force generation to a warfighting mode, but it is the most advanced element of the ANSF. History shows that the initial ability to Transition from force generation and outside support to sustained warfighting competence can take several years to establish and must to be proven in combat over time.

The key factors involved are listed in Page 63.

Here are some key indicators of what may happen:

• The ANA has received far more funding that the ANP. (Page 64)
• The MoD still has serious weaknesses even using an ISAF rating system that sharply understates its real world weaknesses. (p. 65).
• ISAF and US reporting on ANA manpower has serious problems and uncertainties. (p. 66.)
• Even so, the data show that the ANA still has serious attrition problems, often of experienced fighters. (page 67.)
• Readiness ratings reflect force generation assessments, not warfighting capability, but still show sharp variations by major combat unit. (p. 68.)
• These sharp variations by major combat unit affect the cohesion and capability of corps level forces in key regions. (p. 69.)
• The ANA also faces important political challenges. (p. 70)
• History warns this can have a critical impact on elite forces like SOF if the new Afghan government uses the ANA to increase internal political power and control. (p. 71.)

The Challenge of the Afghan National Air Force (ANAF)

The main challenge of the ANAF is that it was never supposed to be ready before 2016. It also raises the issue that close air support is one of the few rapid reaction tools that can deal with a crisis in land combat, land medevac can be too slow in many areas, and air mobility is another asset that save a unit under fire, provide a key tactical advantage, or deal with serious terrain distance issues.

There is no current public plan for dealing these issues or to indicate whether any US and other ISAF air enablers will be present after 2014. There is no indication of how the Afghans could manage air assets effectively, or deal with the problem of civilian casualties. ANAF contracts have also been a source of corruption and waste in the past.

The key challenges affecting the ANAF are listed on Page 74.

The status of the ANAF as of December 2013 is summarized on Page 75.

The Challenge of the Afghan National Police (ANP)

The ANP makes up roughly half of the ANSF, but only the small ANCOP portion of the force is fully trained and equipped to lay a paramilitary role in COIN. The MoI and most elements of the ANP – except for the ANCOPs – also present major problems in terms of overall competence, corruption, leadership, extortion and civil abuses, and ties to powerbrokers and narco-traffickers. Some elements make deals with insurgents.

The ANP presents additional problems because it is not supported by an effective justice system in most of the country, courts are also corrupt, the legal system is slow and unresponsive, detention methods lead to abuses, and detention facilities are poor or lacking.

These issues are addressed in depth in the DoD 1230 Report on Afghanistan and various SIGAR reports, as well as in human rights and other reports. The corruption and inefficiency within elements of Afghan Border Police also limits the flow of a key source of revenue to the government. However, it is unclear what overall structure the ANP will have after the end of 2014, what kind of training efforts will exist after Transition, and what types of outside aid will be provided.

• The range of challenges the ANP forces are shown on Page 80.
• The trends in Afghan’s low ranking in terms of the rule of law and stability is shown in Page 81.
• The structure and manning of the ANP is shown in Page 82.
• A highly optimistic estimate of the readiness of the MoI is shown in Page 83.
• The readiness, build-up, and attrition levels of the ANP are shown in Page 84. Attrition has generally been lower than in the ANA because the ANP is locally recruited and deployed, but could change radically if the ANP becomes a steady source of casualties.
• As is the case with the ANA, readiness varies sharply by unit even using force generation methods of effectiveness. (Page 85.)
• As is the case with the ANA, ethnic structure is a problem, and Tajiks make up roughly 50% of the officers but are only 20% of the population. Few Southern Pashtun are in the ANA and the number in the ANP is limited. (Page 86).
• As is the case with the ANA, readiness varies sharply by region and does not reflect threat levels and priorities. (Page 87)
• The structure and manning of the ANP is shown in Page 82.
• A highly optimistic estimate of the readiness of the MoI is shown in Page 83.
• The readiness, build-up, and attrition levels of the ANP are shown in Page 84. Attrition has generally been lower than in the ANA because the ANP is locally recruited and deployed, but could change radically if the ANP becomes a steady source of casualties.
• As is the case with the ANA, readiness varies sharply by unit even using force generation methods of effectiveness. (Page 85.)
• As is the case with the ANA, ethnic structure is a problem, and Tajiks make up roughly 50% of the officers but are only 20% of the population. Few Southern Pashtun are in the ANA and the number in the ANP is limited. (Page 86).
• As is the case with the ANA, readiness varies sharply by region and does not reflect threat levels and priorities. (Page 87)

The Challenge of the Afghan Local Police (ALP)

The use of local forces is always a high risk given the problems in controlling them, making them effective, dealing with abuses and corruption, and their potential to turn on the government or create links with insurgents.

The 1230 report indicated in October 2013 that ALP expansion was expected to reach 28,500 by February 2014 and 30,000 by December, 2014. It reported that the ALP appeared to be one of the most resilient institutions in the ANSF. It was heavily targeted by EIAs resulting in the highest casualty rate, while recording one of the lowest monthly attrition rates of all ANSF.

As of January 4, 2014, Afghan Local Police (ALP) comprised 25,477 personnel. There were 30,000 personnel by the end of December 2014. The ALP operates in 126 districts in 29 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces..

Capability varied sharply by area, and there were reports of civil abuses and tensions with the ANP and. Government. The ALP with US SOF training did, however, generally make ALP units at least somewhat and all ALP units were to fully transfer to the Afghan government by October 2014.

Key challenges and data are shown in Pages 90-91. It is not clear how the Afghan Local police or other paramilitary forces like the APPF will be integrated into a post 2-104 structure or what their effectiveness will be.

The Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS has also produced a comprehensive three-volume analysis of the Afghan War, available on the CSIS website at the links provided below.

The Afghan War in 2013
Volume I: The Challenges of Leadership and Governance
http://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/130326_afghan_war_in_2013_vol_I.pdf
Volume II: Volume II: Afghan Economics and Outside Aid
https://www.csis.org/analysis/afghan-war-2013-meeting-challenges-transition-volume-ii-afghan-economics-and-outside-aid-0
Volume III: Volume III: Security and the ANSF
https://www.csis.org/analysis/afghan-war-2013-meeting-challenges-transition-volume-iii-security-and-ansf-0

Other recent Burke Chair publications on Afghanistan include:

The Challenges to Transition in Afghanistan: 2014-2015
https://www.csis.org/analysis/post-election-challenges-afghan-transition-2014-2015

Time is Running Out in Afghanistan
https://www.csis.org/analysis/time-running-out-afghanistan-april-5th-election-only-prelude-transition

The Uncertain Strategic Case for the Zero Option in Afghanistan
https://www.csis.org/analysis/uncertain-strategic-case-zero-option-afghanistan