Avoiding Another Long War in Yemen

Saudi Arabia has suffered hundreds of Houthi attacks over the past decade, but none quite like what hit Riyadh the weekend of October 10. As Saudi Arabia sought to reassure executives and investors that the kingdom was safe, the Houthis shut down the country’s main airport and killed more than a dozen travelers and airport staff. In the wake of this attack, there is a risk that Saudi Arabia will repeat the mistakes of earlier phases of the Yemen war, doubling down on a long war that only emboldens the Houthis. But this time, that war will have consequences for both the broader Iran conflict and the global economy. The Saudi government should instead use this as an opportunity to hone a long-term strategy for dealing with the Houthi threat and stabilizing Yemen. Doing so requires recognizing the limits of the current military campaign against the Houthis and mobilizing a collective, sustained effort to build the Yemeni government as a more effective alternative to the Houthis.

Since July, the Houthis have rapidly moved up the escalatory ladder with Riyadh: They began by targeting Saudi-affiliated shipping in the Red Sea, followed by Saudi oil infrastructure. Those attacks focused on stemming Saudi oil exports, creating economic pain for the kingdom at a time when the Iran conflict was already constraining oil flows. But by hitting Riyadh’s airport, the Houthis have significantly expanded both the economic and political consequences for Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia, a large country that grew accustomed to persistent Houthi attacks prior to the 2022 Yemen truce, is not as economically vulnerable as some of its smaller neighbors. But its ambitious economic diversification agenda and political ambitions rely on a steady stream of travelers—world leaders, investors, and executives—who almost all arrive through a single entry point: Riyadh’s airport. While the closure of the airport may be temporary, travelers will remember the images of the October 10 attack for months and potentially years to come. In this way, persistent Houthi attacks on the airport seek to isolate Saudi Arabia and message that, as long as the Yemen war continues, Saudi Arabia is not open for business. The decision to shift to virtual participation for Riyadh’s flagship Future Investment Initiative (FII) conference and postpone the high-level European Union–Gulf Cooperation Council summit shows how the consequences of Houthi attacks extend far beyond the immediate physical damage.

Escalatory Spiral

The escalation is not over. On Tuesday, Saudi Arabia launched multiple attacks against major oil depots in Houthi-controlled areas, which Saudi Arabia has said are central to the Houthis’ attacks. Fuel sales are also a significant source of revenue for the Houthis; the U.S. Treasury Department estimated that the Houthis gain over $2 billion annually from illicit oil sales. In response, the Houthis launched another wave of attacks, including new attacks on the Riyadh airport and an attack on the Aramco headquarters in Dharan that reportedly led to significant building damage. On Thursday, the Houthis also attacked the presidential palace in Aden that houses the Yemeni government, killing two security personnel.

While both Saudi Arabia and the Houthis can inflict significant pain with these attacks, the attacks themselves are unlikely to change the balance of power within the Yemen conflict. Years of war have demonstrated that the Houthis can endure enormous economic pain and rebound from aggressive strikes on both military assets and personnel. The Houthis and their partners have leveraged increasingly diversified supply chains, agile domestic production, and new technology to quickly restore lost assets and hone new capabilities, such that they have often emerged from these campaigns stronger than before they started. While there was much speculation about the extent of the damage from U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on the Houthis between 2024 and 2025, recent Houthi attacks suggest their capabilities have only continued to improve. And much like their partner Iran, it is not clear that economic pain will convince the Houthis to moderate their demands, let alone lead to their collapse.

Riyadh understands the limitations of airstrikes, which is why it is backing the Yemeni government in a counteroffensive against the Houthis. The “Yemen Dawn” offensive was announced on October 5 with the stated aim of liberating all Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen, though it is highly unlikely the offensive will succeed in achieving anything near its stated aims. The initial results of Yemen Dawn have been limited, with the Yemeni government regaining territory around the mouth of the Bab al-Mandab but the Houthis making gains around Taiz, Yemen’s third-largest city and an important link between the coast and the government base in the south. Deep divisions within the Yemeni government continue to undermine the forces on the battlefield and contributed to the rapid losses along the coast in September.

While Saudi Arabia attempted to unify Yemeni government forces under a single command earlier this year, these rifts cannot be healed by shifting reporting structures; they stem from the lack of a unifying political agenda among the various groups underneath the government umbrella. For some, the motivations of competing factions within the government—whether southern secession, religious aims, or merely individual power struggles—are viewed as a greater threat than the Houthis themselves. The splits within the Yemeni government are further amplified by divisions between their major regional backers, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Houthis, meanwhile, have proven adept at exploiting these differences, both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table.

Saudi Arabia’s Options

Assuming that neither airstrikes nor the Yemeni government–led ground offensive neutralize Houthi threats to Saudi Arabia, the kingdom will likely be faced with two options: negotiate at least a temporary pause with the Houthis or maintain a low level of conflict to avoid making painful concessions that will also only further deepen splits within the anti-Houthi coalition. For years, Riyadh favored the latter approach, even while front lines within Yemen remained largely static and Houthi capabilities only continued to grow. In 2022, however, Saudi Arabia instead adopted the former strategy, endorsing a truce between the Houthis and the Yemeni government and pursuing direct talks with the Houthis to try to establish some form of coexistence.

But the Houthi threat to Saudi Arabia has deepened substantially since 2022. For the past three years, the Houthis have demonstrated a sustained intent and capability to constrain traffic through the Red Sea. The Red Sea is not just an important waterway for Saudi Arabia; for years, the kingdom has funneled investment into its western coast as a link to Europe, Africa, and the West and made those investments the centerpiece of its economic diversification efforts. Continued expansion of Houthi control over the Red Sea could jeopardize Riyadh’s vision for the economic future of the country.

In light of the expanding Houthi threat, there is a real risk that Riyadh will get sucked into another long but ultimately unsuccessful war. The current escalation has all the hallmarks of the kind of war that has only emboldened the Houthis in the past: heavy reliance on airstrikes, ground campaigns by fragmented forces, and a lack of credible military or political objectives. The consequences of a sustained war would also reverberate far beyond Yemen and Saudi Arabia. It would make de-escalation of the Iran conflict harder, as it would deepen tensions between the Saudi government and the Iranian regime. It would drive up global energy prices, as the Houthis would likely continue to threaten fuel flows from one of the world’s largest oil exporters. And the Houthis would likely exploit the conflict to expand their influence across the Red Sea, further disrupting a critical global waterway and eroding the principle of freedom of navigation.

Saudi Arabia may well have decided that coexistence with the Houthis—at least in their current form—is not possible. But that does not mean Riyadh should stay locked in a costly and ultimately fruitless battle indefinitely. Saudi Arabia must be clear-eyed about the limitations of what the current military campaign can accomplish and be prepared to pursue de-escalation once those limits have been realized. But de-escalation should not mean disengagement. Instead, Saudi Arabia should use that period to (1) mobilize a collective effort with regional and international partners to finally address the rifts within the Yemeni government and broader anti-Houthi coalition, (2) build the capacity of that government, and (3) unify around a credible political end state for Yemen. These are difficult tasks that will take time, and they cannot be achieved while fighting an active war. In the wake of the Houthi attacks on the Riyadh airport, Saudi Arabia’s lesson should not be that the 2022 truce was a mistake—it should be that it did not use the calm the truce provided as effectively as it should have.

Allison Minor is a senior fellow in the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. She previously served as the U.S. deputy special envoy for Yemen.